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Privatization" and the Late




This Article analyzes the contemporary program of
"corporatization without privatization" in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) directed at China's traditional state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) through a consideration of long ago
precursor enterprise establishments-starting from the last
Chinese imperial dynasty's creation of "government-promoted/-
supervised, merchant-financed/-operated" (guandu shangban)
firms in the latter part of the nineteenth century. While analysts
are tempted to see the PRC corporations with listings on
international exchanges that dominate the global economy and
capital markets as expressions of "convergence," this Article
argues that such firms in fact show deeply embedded aspects of
path dependency unique to the Chinese context even prior to the
fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. To that end, this Article
identifies commonalities between China's large-scale state
(imperial court)-promoted or -operated enterprises after 1870
and the PRC's largest corporations and corporate groups that
have grown since the early 1990s-commonalities which touch
on the national development ambitions behind such firm
establishments, financing, operations, monopoly franchise
rights, corporate governance, relationship to law and domestic
and transnational legal systems, the interaction between the
state and other non-state sectors, and more. Conversely, the
Article investigates key differences in the surrounding
geopolitical, political, legal, economic, and market environments
between the late nineteenth century and today, so as to explain
how today's largest Chinese enterprises are, and will be, distinct
from their nineteenth century ancestors. This Article does not
address the extent to which China's corporatized, publicly held
* Professor of Law, Michigan Law School.
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SOEs should be understood as "sovereign" for purposes of
evaluating foreign sovereign immunity and the like. Instead,
this Article aims to help policy makers, global capital markets
participants, and even corporate governance specialists
understand more concretely the underlying differences between
modern China's apparently convergent corporations, on one
side, and corporate enterprises operating and financed in other
parts of the world, on the other. This analysis may, in turn,
illuminate the future trajectory of the PRC and its rising
corporate entities as global political and economic actors of
abiding power and influence.
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I. CONVERGENCE, PATH DEPENDENCY, AND THE "CORPORATIZED"
CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE (SOE)
For almost two decades, developed-world academic discourse on
"the firm," corporate governance, and corporate and securities law
has fixated on the possibility of global "convergence" and the
continuing frustration of that possibility because of "path
dependence."
On the one side, convergence with respect to firm organization
and governance across distinct political, economic, and legal systems
seemed assured given agreement on what kind of firm was most
economically efficient-efficient in its productive tasks, but also what
kind of firm (active in what kind of capital market) offered the best
mechanism for the efficient allocation of capital. This, so argued the
strongest proponents of convergence, was the Anglo-(US) American
"shareholder-oriented" model of firm organization and governance:
widely held companies with most or all of their shares publicly
traded, featuring complete separation of ownership and management,
all regulated by (i) enabling corporate law with a key role ceded to ex
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post standard-applying common law-style judicial institutions,' and
(ii) a securities regulatory system focused on mandatory information
disclosure and strict prohibitions on insider and manipulative
trading.2 Emphasis on the way to best ensure the efficient allocation
of capital allowed for the possibility of slightly weaker convergence
but specifically with respect to the world's largest publicly listed
companies, or a convergence driven by the shared expectations of the
increasingly global capital markets and the impact of the securities
law and regulation of those markets on the law of corporate
organization and governance.3 Perhaps the most penetrating vision of
convergence identified national systems where functional
convergence (sometimes effected simply by contract) might occur,
notwithstanding apparently frustrated formal convergence.4
Informing this side of the debate was a justified questioning of the
viability and long term success of organizational and legal
transplants from allegedly more mature political, economic, and legal
systems (mostly Northern hemisphere Western, but usually including
pre-Recession Japan) to 'less developed" national systems.5
On the other side, academic analysts predicted not convergence,
but stubborn and persistent "divergence," resulting from historical
developments and political and ideological forces unique to the still-
relevant national unit.6 These path-dependent factors resulted not
only in specific, and distinct, firm capital structures and legal and
organizational norms, but also in insulation of certain national
1. See, in particular, the "legal origins" law and finance literature, attempting
to prove empirically that an Anglo-American, common law system is superior, at least
in comparison to civil law systems and with respect to the creation of strong and
efficient capital markets. These authors asserted that (i) common law jurisdictions are
more protective of property rights generally, and specifically the rights of minority
shareholders in corporate firms, and (ii) civil law systems "over-regulate" private
economic activity, and private ordering in particular. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleiefer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. OF FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997).
2. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 455-56 (2003).
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. L. REV. 641, 707
(1999).
4. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 338 (2001).
5. See Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants:
The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 889
(2003); Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers
in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2208-09 (2005).
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 167-70 (1999); Mark D.
West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from
Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 553-55 (2001) (noting divergence
in Japanese and United States corporate law between 1950 and 2000 despite similar
starting positions).
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systems or practices from the global forces identified as the drivers
behind hoped-for convergence-mostly the firm and capital allocation
efficiency goals described above.7
In the almost two decades between the start of the convergence/
path-dependency debate and the present day, the globe has witnessed
the rise of explicitly corporate behemoths from the People's Republic
of China (PRC or China). These PRC-controlled firms, whether
domiciled in the PRC "mainland"8 or outside, now complete the
largest initial public offerings (IPOs) and corporate finance
transactions in history, dominate listings of the world's largest
enterprises by market capitalization and revenues, have shares
traded on both PRC exchanges and the major international stock
exchanges, and act increasingly beyond China's national borders to
acquire control of firms and assets positioned in other national
jurisdictions, including many of China's erstwhile tutors in the arts of
economic and legal system development.
Superficial analysis-not just from global underwriters
managing and hard-selling gargantuan PRC-origin IPOs-has always
explicitly trumpeted the PRC's new corporate entities and the
corporate governance system within which they are situated as
"convergent" in the terms described above.9 After all, they say, the
PRC's corporate firms feature every formal aspect of a "modern"
corporation and corporate law system:
* legal personality for the firm;
* perpetual existence of the corporation;
* "owner-shielding" asset partitioning (i.e., limited liability for
investor shareholders) coupled with "entity-shielding" asset
partitioning (i.e., state-provided rules that protect the firm
from the claims of creditors of the firm's investors or other
entities in which such shareholders are invested);1 0
* formal separation of ownership (the shareholders) from
management (the board of directors);
* centralized management (the board of directors, again) acting
pursuant to a simple majority vote;
7. See Bebehuk & Roe, supra note 6, at 150; West, supra note 6, at 601.
8. For the purposes of this article, the PRC means the PRC excluding the
Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao, and Taiwan/the Republic of
China.
9. See, e.g., Chao Xi, In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board
Reforms and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,
27 (2006) ("China's board reform strategy, featuring the mandatory independent
director requirement for listed companies, clearly demonstrates a formal convergence
toward the Anglo-American governance model.").
10. See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1335, 1337-40 (2006) (examining entity shielding
as a universial characteristic of modern business firms).
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* indicia of a desirable "shareholder orientation" in the PRC's
formal company law and securities regulation, including: a
board of directors elected and removed by voting
shareholders; officers appointed by a board of directors
responsible to the shareholders; corporate fiduciary duties
owed to the firm (and its shareholders) by orthodox fiduciaries
(directors, supervisory board members, and officers) and even
controlling shareholders; corporate law doctrines like
"oppression" (to protect minority shareholders) and a
corporate derivative action allowing minority shareholders to
work around the board in suing breaching fiduciaries on
behalf of the firm, etc.;
* free transferability of, often publicly-traded, share capital;
* veil piercing (to protect third party creditors in tort or
contract), etc.
At the same time, there has been a good deal of writing by more
discerning analysts identifying how the products of China's
"corporatization without privatization" established in the political-
legal system and corporate governance ecology unique to the post-
1978 Reform-era PRC are anything but convergent and have a
"Chinese characteristics"-hugging path dependency." That path
dependency is often understood as rooted in (i) China's post-1949
political and ideological settlement, or the basic tenets of Mao
Zedong's elaboration of Marxist orthodoxy, which requires that
ownership of the means of production be firmly vested in "the
people"'2 as represented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-
controlled state (the PRC Party State), (ii) China's development
model-increasingly called "state capitalism"13-and (iii) resistance
11. See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority
Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People's Republic of China in THE
DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 243, 245-47
(Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2012); Donald C.
Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 494, 494-
95 (2003); Nicholas C. Howson, Corporate Law in the Shanghai People's Courts, 1992-
2008: Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 303,
321-7 (2010); Nicholas C. Howson, "Quack Corporate Governance" as Traditional
Chinese Medicine - the Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China's Corporate Law
and a State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, 37
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667, 689-94 (2014) [hereinafter Howson, "Quack Corporate
Governance' .
12. Note that for Mao and the CCP in 1949, the "people" was more than just
the "proletariat" and included, at least initially, the "the workers, peasants and
military," while excluding class enemies (landlords, capitalists, haute bourgeoisie, etc.),
reactionary party members, spies, etc. This alternative formulation of who precisely
the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese Marxist state it controls, represent has
important implications for the contemporary corporatization program discussed here.
13. See Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of China's
State Capitalism (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015).
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against any alternative path arising from the power and interest of
incumbent control parties which actually operate PRC firms.
Yet, even the most discerning analysts have rarely looked
further back into history to understand how these same factors
shaped China's nineteenth and early twentieth century "firms" and
contributed to the same path dependency.1 4 It is that underperformed
glance into history that is the stimulus for this writing. Said another
way, this Article proposes revived consideration of some of China's
late nineteenth and early twentieth century firms-not as historical
artifacts proving or denying the buds of a pre-Communist industrial
capitalism1 5 or as exotic curiosities demonstrating how late imperial
China failed to understand the power of the British East India
Company1 6 (they did understand)-but as the precursors of, and in
some ways determinative models for, the same massive PRC
corporations that now stand astride the world.
Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes in
summary terms the genesis and fruits of the PRC's corporatization
without privatization program, emphasizing the political,
organizational, and legal ecologies in which China's corporatized
SOEs function. Part III focuses on a lesser-known story-aspects of
firm organization and governance norms in China from a time before
the end of imperial rule in 1911, which have very strong resonance for
today's PRC firms established in a radically different political,
economic, and historical circumstance and informed by a completely
different degree of transnational engagement. Part IV isolates
common elements between the two generations of enterprise
establishment in China, regardless in many cases of the governing
(domestic or transnational) law, the surrounding political legal
environment, and the degree of interaction with the world outside of
China. This Part demonstrates aspects of firm organization and
governance from more than a century ago that reveal the path
dependencies working so strongly today in the PRC. Part V concludes
with a consideration of the possible trajectory of the PRC and its
14. Each of Ruskola, Kirby and Zelin have written extremely useful studies of
China's pre-1980s firm establishments, but published this work before the PRC's "state
capitalist"-model corporatized SOEs developed to the form we see today. Accordingly,
their studies are useful as histories of institutional and legal (both statutory and
contractual) developments, but do not look to those historical institutions and
arrangements to understand similar kinds of institutions in the late 2010s. See
William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in
Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995); Teemu Ruskola,
Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory
in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000); Madeleine Zelin, The Firm in
Early Modern China, 71 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 623 (2009).
15. See, e.g., ALBERT FEUERWERKER, CHINA'S EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION:
SHENG HSUAN-HUAI (1844-1916) AND MANDARIN ENTERPRISE 250 (1958).
16. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE ComNPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 7 (2005).
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corporate entities as global actors of great and abiding influence and
of whether, in this sphere at least, "law-Chinese or foreign-
matters."1 7
II. THE STATE-CONTROLLED CHINESE CORPORATION AND ENTERPRISE
IN THE LATE 2010S
This Part describes one form of the modern PRC enterprise legal
person (or group of legal persons) as it (they) exist(s) today. To set up
the desired comparison with Chinese firms of yesteryear, this Part
must generalize a rather complex picture, but also focus on a
particular form of Chinese corporation-the corporatized traditional
SOE and its group of affiliated enterprises, the same entities and
groups which presently occupy the heights of China's productive
economy and not incidentally the global capital markets.1 8
Accordingly, this Part mostly neglects the very large number of firms
active in China that are not built upon the assets or franchise rights
of former SOEs or government departments, small and medium
enterprises which have grown from (often local government-owned)
"collectively-owned" and "township and village enterprises", and the
myriad of other successful enterprises in the Chinese landscape
evidencing something closer to "private" rather than public
ownership, including entities active outside of China but with only
opaque relationships to the PRC Party State such as Anbang and
Wanke.19 The path dependencies this Article illustrates are most
immediately identifiable when studying the PRC's present day
corporate (and group) giants that have been erected on the
foundations of China's traditional SOEs.
Donald Clarke and I, among others, have tried to explain China's
Reform era "corporatization" program and its consequences for the
Chinese firm and the nature of corporate law and corporate
17. I should note that this particular writing does not address the ever-
important question of how "sovereign" China's corporatized SOEs and SOE groups are
for traditional or modern statutory sovereign immunity analysis. Nonetheless, I believe
there are aspects of this analysis which will help observers understand the relationship
of some of the world's largest enterprises with China's sovereign power.
18. See Global 500, FORTUNE, http://www.fortune.com/global500/list/ (last
visited Aug. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cclJ732-DZU2] (archived Aug. 23, 2017) (listing
three corporatized PRC SOEs in the top five companies worldwide (State Grid, China
National Petroleum Corporation, and Sinopec) and eleven in the top fifty (in addition
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural
Bank of China, Bank of China, Ping An Insurance, China Mobile, and the Shanghai
Automotive Industry Corporation)).
19. See, for example, my Return of the Prodigal Form? - Partnerships and
Partnership Law in the People's Republic of China, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PARTNERSHIPS, LLC AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 390, 390-
91 (Robert Hillman & Mark Loewenstein eds., 2016).
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governance in the PRC.20 The traditional PRC SOE-or in literal
English translation of the Chinese term "enterprise under the system
of ownership by all the people" (quanminsuoyouzhiqiye)-was not
what many mistook it for, a legal person owned by a single
shareholder: the state (on behalf of "all the people"). The traditional
and pre-Reform era SOE was in fact a division or ring-fencing of
productive and social assets by a given state administration, which
did not grant separate legal personality or competence to that group
of assets or to the SOE of which it was deemed to be part. Nor did the
division or ring-fencing have the status of an independent accounting
unit, and thus by the same token it did not have profits, losses,
taxable gains, or any accountability for the same. Indeed, historically
there was no enterprise income tax system for domestic SOEs and
thus no enterprise income tax levied on the gross revenues of SOEs,
which were thus solely cost centers. This made perfect sense when
SOEs operated pursuant to a centralized state plan, using annual
grants from the state to fund the purchase of inputs and to meet
annual operating expenses and the cost of social services, with the
mandate that all net earnings were returned to the funds-granting
government. In China, the traditional SOE had Chinese Communist
Party-appointed, non-business - managers scaling the Party's
nomenklatura personnel appointments system and thus moving
through a defined bureaucracy into progressively more powerful
political positions.2 1 The traditional SOE did not issue ownership
interests in itself, like stock or equity. The SOE "borrowed" from
other traditional SOEs configured as "banks" (only after 1994
"commercial banks"-thus distinguished from "policy banks" which
continued as channels for direct grants from the state), with such
borrowings functioning as another vehicle for the infusion of state-
provided funding outside of direct grants by the state to the
enterprises. The "control" interest in SOEs (the right to appoint
management and appropriate some portion of gross revenues, and
once an enterprise tax system came into existence, net revenues) was
vested in some identity of the state-often central-line ministries
(e.g., the Ministry of Textile Industry) or ministry-type bodies
transformed directly into SOEs (e.g., the Ministry of Petroleum
Industry metamorphosed into the China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC)), but also subordinate units of government such
as local (usually provincial or large municipal-level) bureaus of the
line ministries (e.g., the Jiangsu Bureau of Textile Industry) or
20. See Howson, "Quack Corporate Governance", supra note 11, at 690-94.
21. Nicholas C. Howson, China's Restructured Commercial Banks:
Nomenklatura Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform? in CHINA'S
EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123, 152 (Zhu Min,
Cai Jinqing & Martha Avery eds., 2011).
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equivalent local-level People's Governments (e.g., the Jiangsu
Provincial People's Government).
This was the status quo ante system for traditional SOEs
addressed by the corporatization program that began, experimentally
and without much central government sanction, in the mid-1980s.
Corporatization, confirmed in (all-important) policy terms with the
advent of the "modern enterprise system" articulated in Communist
Party policy in the early 1990s, and in (far less important) legal terms
with the 1994 PRC Company Law, sought to abolish the SOE as a
non-law-based organizational form22 by converting such SOEs, or
parts of them, into a legal form under a "Company Law." That new
legal form for SOEs governed by the Company Law could take one of
three forms: (i) the company limited by shares (CLS) (gufen youxian
gongsi) for widely held firms issuing stock with assumed separation
of ownership and management;2 3 (ii) the limited liability company
(LLC) (youxian zeren gongsi) issuing less-liquid equity interests
(formally "registered capital interests") for smaller and more closely
knit groups of investors with less presumed separation of ownership
and management;24 and (iii) the wholly state-owned company
(WSOC) sub-form of the LLC, for companies erected on the backs of
traditional SOEs owned directly by state agencies with no
shareholders' meeting and a merely optional board of directors.
This process of corporatization did not initially and to this day
does not implicate "privatization" of the PRC economy or its
traditional SOEs, much less any withdrawal of the PRC Party State
from the same. Why? Because a controlling equity interest in the
resulting corporate entity went to or was maintained by the
incumbent Party State control party of the pre-conversion SOE,
originally 100 percent, but diluted as the newly established corporate
entity engaged, post-hiving off of the burdens connected to the SOE's
traditional social assets, in the issuance of new capital to capital
markets investors, with the equity control position decreasing to 70 to
80 percent.25 (Over time, these absolute control positions have been
further diluted with subsequent capital raisings, but never below a
strong 50 to 60 percent).26 Moreover, the prior bureaucratic channels
22. Ironically, the SOE was only given a post hoc legal basis in 1988 with the
promulgation of a 'law" concerning SOEs, just as the PRC was intent on abolishing
SOEs as an organizational and legal form.
23. Modeled on the German Aktiengesellschaft or "AG."
24. Modeled on the German Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung or "GmbH."
25. See Howson, "Quack Corporate Governance", supra note 11, at 691
("[Corporatization] did not implicate privatization because a controlling equity interest
in the converted SOEs went to or was maintained by state entities.").
26. Some analysts understand the "share split reform" (guquan fenzhi gaige)
initiative of 2005 as a remedy to such overly concentrated capital structures at Chinese
listed firms. That is a misconception. The share split reform sought to address market
overhang and public equity valuation problems arising from the fact that the state's
controlling equity positions in companies with listed shares were held via non-tradable
2017] 969
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of control working on SOEs remain largely undisturbed by the change
in organizational form from CCP Party State policy-authorized SOE
to law-based corporate entity, in which continuing lines of authority
and decision making subvert almost completely the overlay of public
norms described in law and regulation.
To the present day, the PRC Party State remains absolutely
committed to retaining control over converted enterprises in the
broadest range of sectors-not just the usual suspects for state
control (e.g., defense and national security, power generation,
extractive industries, and key infrastructure), but also non-national
security and non-key infrastructure sectors that are extremely
profitable for central or local Party State insiders, especially when
financed by largely passive and information-deprived public
investors, Chinese and foreign.
Since the early 2000s, traditional SOE systems have
increasingly used corporatization of specific assets to assemble
corporate "groups" of legal person subsidiaries and non-legal person
divisions under a core group holding company, which serves as either
(i) the controlling shareholder of the group's legal person subsidiaries
or (ii) the headquarters of the subordinate divisions, with those
corporate subsidiaries-not the holding company positioned at the
top-seeking finance from the Chinese and foreign capital markets.27
These groups benefit from monopoly rights over a certain business
sector (or operational or geographical subdivision of that sector)
sometimes implemented as a duopoly or triopoly to create the
impression of competition. The group's core holding company is
"owned" on behalf of "all the people" entirely by a central government
(State Council) agency now called the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The core
holding company of the enterprise group is usually organized as a
WSOC, the wholly state-owned sub-species of the LLC described
above, which has no shareholders' meeting and an optional board of
directors The core holding company, managed by Party State
nomeklatura appointees who rotate between central and local official
posts and enterprise executive offices or directorships (and even
between allegedly competing enterprise groups in a single monopoly
or duopoly sector), coordinates the entire group's business activities.
shares. Under this 2005-6 share split reform initiative, holders of non-tradable shares
(the state and legal person shareholders holding equity on behalf of the state) were
given the right to sell their shares on PRC exchanges in return for present
compensation payable to the suddenly diluted shareholders of the public float. While
this reform did make state and legal person shares liquid, and there was some
moderate selling down of the state's interest in listed firms, the program only reduced
very moderately the Party State's controlling position in listed firms. See Andrea
Beltratti et al., The Stock Market Reaction to the 2005 Non-Tradeable Share Reform in
China 5-6 (Working Paper Series no. 1339, 2011).
27. Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions:




They do this in the interest, above all, of state industrial policy, and
certainly with a preference for such national policy over what might
be in the interest of shareholder wealth maximization for the non-
group, minority shareholders invested in the individual legal person
subsidiaries often through the public capital markets.
Almost on a level with the group core holding company is a group
"finance holding company," which directs group internal revenue
streams to group internal subsidiary enterprises or divisions, without
much concern for the boundaries of distinct legal entities, much less
the basic creditworthiness of group internal recipient entities. In
short, the finance holding company entity allocates finance and
investment strictly among its subsidiaries and affiliates, and it serves
the group's controlled entities, with no concern whatsoever for the
financing of external entities, much less the ultimate formal "owner"
of the group, the state (acting through SASAC). 28
SASAC is an empty bureaucratic box or a proxy for the state's (or
"all the peoples"') majority ownership interest in the nation's
productive assets. SASAC is thinly staffed, has little or no political
heft when not the cat's paw of powerful State Council or Politburo
actors, and exercises no control over its "owned" core holding
companies positioned at the top of various groups. As such, SASAC
continues as the long-standing "absent principal" in the Chinese
corporate governance scheme formerly known as the "state" or "all
the people" represented by the state, just under a different name or
institutional title. PRC corporate groups, and by extension their
subsidiaries and divisions, are therefore actually controlled by Party
State nomenklatura insider appointees working at the core holding
company level, and as directors and officers of the subsidiary entities
controlled *by the core holding company. As Party State bureaucratic
political actors seeking advancement in the Party system, these
individuals are perfectly responsive to Party State policy (which
necessarily includes national industrial policy), while at the same
time they are content to ignore the interests of external minority
shareholders in the listed subsidiaries they formally manage.
To give a concrete illustration of how this structure works,
consider a slightly anachronistic vision of the China National
Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec) Group,29 anachronistic only
because some of the elements described together below were not in
place concurrently. Posit that Sinopec has a monopoly on all
downstream hydrocarbons businesses in China, thus gas stations,
28. See id. at 717-21.
29. See SINOPEc, http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/ (last visited Aug. 26,
2017) [https://perma.cc/7UXH-7WV4] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) (Sinopec Group's
website in English); SINOPEc, http://www.sinopec.com/listco (last visited Aug. 26, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/8648-9Z7Y] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) (China Petroleum and Chemical
Co. website in Chinese).
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refining, petrochemicals, etc.-everything separate from exploration,
development and production, and energy transportation businesses,
all of which are the province of other enterprise groups (here, the
separate families of companies under the CNPC and China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) groups). There is a Sinopec core
holding company at the center of this group-the "Sinopec Group
Holding Company", which is a WSOC 100 percent "owned" by a State
Council department now called SASAC. A majority-controlled
subsidiary, department, or affiliated entity would function as a
dedicated "finance holding company" necessary for the allocation of
funds and finance to and among operations and entities included in
the Sinopec Group. Sinopec Group Holding Company, explicitly
permitted in its business license to invest in other entities, in turn
owns a vast number of only Sinopec business-related subsidiaries,
each with a business scope allowing it to operate in a defined sector
within the group's larger monopoly (e.g., oil refining, gas stations, or
petrochemicals) or defined geographical areas (e.g., just Jiangsu
Province, or just three southern coastal provinces). Those subsidiaries
will always show majority equity ownership in the hands of the
Sinopec Group Holding Company or one of its controlled subsidiaries,
but they can be financed directly by bank loans, minority non-public
investment, or the public capital markets (domestic or foreign). Thus,
for example, this Sinopec Group might seek to reorganize a
traditional SOE grouping of productive and social assets conducting a
petrochemicals business in the Shanghai suburbs of Jinshan District
into a Sinopec Group Holding Company-controlled company called
"Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited," which could
complete an IPO on the PRC domestic or foreign capital markets.
After the IPO, issuer Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company
Limited would still be dominated absolutely by the core holding
company via an 80 percent equity stake and its power to appoint all
directors and officers of the listed subsidiary. Moreover, Sinopec
Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited would benefit from well-
advertised preferences critical to its commercial success, preferences
relating to regulatory breaks, supply or other inputs, availability or
pricing, or exclusive access to certain markets at preferred (higher)
prices, importantly preferences delivered not just by other Sinopec
Group affiliates but even by other Party State-controlled competitors
(e.g., the supply of crude oil for refining from CNPC).30
30. This is not a fanciful example, and tracks exactly the first IPO of a PRC-
domiciled issuer on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1992 and indirectly via
American Depositary Shares and Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). See SINOPEC, http://www.sinopec.com/listco/en/about-sinopec/subsidiaries/
subsidiariesjoint-ventures/20161109/news 20161109_400111388102.shtml (last
visited Aug. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K9BT-AGVM] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) for the
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited website, which trades on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange (under "SEHK'), the New York Stock Exchange (American
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The negative effects of such a "corporatization without
privatization" program on corporate governance and productive
efficiencies-at least with respect to the controlled subsidiary firms
that have a public float-have been well aired in the literature.
Suffice it to say that the result has been a keen horizontal, not
vertical (i.e., minority shareholders versus controlling shareholders,
not general shareholders' meeting versus board of directors), agency
problem, where the party able to extract the private (here the better
word is "specific" or "tunneled") benefits of control of the enterprise
and expropriate returns from and otherwise oppress the minority
(often) public shareholders is far more than a run-of-the-mill control
party. It is instead a legal person or natural person identity of the
Party State (central or local), giving it or them a potent mix of
political and economic power, especially against disaggregated, non-
politically privileged minority shareholders. The result was and is as
to be expected: an unconstrained opportunity for control parties qua
controlling shareholders to engage in oppression of minority
shareholders, tunneling, and outright expropriation, where other
state institutions (i.e., the judiciary or agencies) that might act as a
check against such control parties are politically conflicted, burdened
with limited bureaucratic autonomy, or suffering from competency
constraints.
Notwithstanding that expected result, however, and perhaps
most important for the current analysis, China's largest corporate
issuers continue to attract ready purchasers on the PRC's domestic
capital markets and on global exchanges, even when the underlying
business and assets are in very bad shape.3 ' Said another way, if
corporatization without privatization was, at least in part, about
financing money-losing state assets through the public capital
markets-i.e., gaining finance through legal forms recognized across
the world whereby (i) the incumbent control party's absolute control
of the assets remains undisturbed, (ii) state banks do not have to pile
Depositary Receipts, "SHI") and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (A shares, under
"SSE"). It has long been rumored that this long-ago initial listing vehicle for the
Sinopec Group will be "privatized," meaning the public investors in this Shanghai
subsidiary will be bought out, so that the later (2000-1)-appointed Sinopec group listed
subsidiary, China Petroleum & Chemical Company Limited (also trading on the
Shanghai, Hong Kong and New York exchanges), will stand alone as Sinopec Corp's
finance window on the domestic and international capital markets.
31. See, for example, the 2010 US $22.1 billion IPO by the Agricultural Bank of
China, still the largest IPO in world history, but one completed with respect to a vastly
underperforming "bank" entity. See Michael Wines, China Bank IPO Raises $19
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/business/
global/07ipo.html (subscription required) [https://perma.ccIY6BF-E4FP (archived Aug.
26, 2017) (detailing 2010 IPO effected after purchase of $60 billion in non-performing
loans in the late 1990s, the revelation of $7.5 billion of fraudulent loans in 2006, a 2008
$19 billion recapitalization of the bank when 25% of its loans were non-performing, and
another purchase of bad debt of US$120 billion just before the IPO, leaving the bank,
at the time of the IPO, with almost 3% of its loans as non-performing - the highest of
any reporting bank in the world).
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in more money from the PRC state treasury, and (iii) the investors
are assuredly passive, and uniquely information- and collective
action-challenged-then it has been an undiluted success. However,
for those Chinese policymakers who saw corporatization without
privatization as the way to separation of ownership and management,
and to the possibility of some effective monitoring of and
accountability for firm managers in the service of economically
efficient (shareholder wealth-maximizing) firms, the process has
proven almost irrelevant.
It bears emphasizing that the process outlined above, or the
track whereby SOEs "owned" and operated directly by the Party
State have been corporatized but not privatized, is not the entire
picture of what has happened in the PRC over the past several
decades. Indeed, very often after corporatization of traditional PRC
SOEs but maintenance of the Party State's-central or local level-
control position, real control is in fact given over to insiders who
increasingly act in their own interest or in the interest of their
"system" (xitong).3 2 As will be explained below, this fuller process has
distinct similarities to what occurred in China in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries during the transitions of Qing
enterprise from (i) state-financed and -operated to (ii) state-promoted
but privately financed and operated to (iii) state private co-operated
and finally to (iv) (present or former) state official-operated but in the
private interest of those state officials upon whom control is
bestowed. An example of how this has occurred in modern China
comes from the early and mid-1990s. At that time, then CCP General
Secretary Jiang Zemin directed the military (the People's Liberation
Army (PLA))-the third and roughly co-equal silo of institutional
power in the PRC Party State, alongside the CCP and the state-to
remove itself from industry and commerce, which it had entered from
the earliest days of the Reform era. The PLA formally complied, but
not by withdrawing from industry. Instead, the PLA, or more
specifically departments of the PLA, established holding companies
separate from the PLA with national and international investments
(e.g., China Northern Group (Norinco), China Southern Group, Poly
Group) operated by PLA "system" insiders. Or, in many cases, PLA
personnel who had been managing significant groups of assets
controlled by the military simply retired from their military positions
to become full-time civilian directors or officers (e.g., Huawei). So,
instead of the PLA withdrawing from industry, PLA assets were
withdrawn from the PLA (and aggregated under corporate groups run
by civilians), or PLA officers themselves withdrew from the military
to continue to engage in industrial pursuits (and to act on behalf of
their former military masters). The same process is also identified in
32. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION
THROUGH REFORM 218-19, 232-33 (2nd ed. 2003).
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the recent rise of new PRC conglomerates like Anbang Insurance and
Ping An Insurance, huge groups operating in sectors that did not
exist in the planned economy of the pre-Reform era, but with the
benefit of Party State networks and patronage, and under the
direction of individuals closely connected to the Party State.
The foregoing is, admittedly, a rather superficial and
generalizing picture of the PRC's policy-driven corporatization
without privatization process over several decades. With an eye to
understanding the deeper historical roots of this program and
outcomes, below are the basic policy imperatives that have caused a
system like this to come into being, followed by a list of some of the
key resulting characteristics of those outcomes (including the fact
that "law" seems to have little relation to the process).
First, consider some of the key policy imperatives supporting a
program of "corporatization without privatization" and Party State-
"owned" groups:
* Whatever organizational adjustments are made with
respect to the institutions governing accumulations of
productive assets or sectors of economic activity, the
state and its agents remain in control, at least
formally (at inception), and then over time,
functionally;
* The PRC needs large amounts of capital for projects
designed to make China "rich and powerful";
* The government of the PRC seeks protection
against-and the creation of domestic (and eventually
global) competitors for-capital- and technology-rich
foreign invested enterprises, in China or (eventually)
globally, especially in a period where foreign trading
inside China and/or foreign investment in China
benefits from capital endowment and (foreign) market
access advantages, and/or regulatory protection or
preferences;
* The PRC state treasury is unable or unwilling to
continue-or wants to minimize-unrecoverable
funding of the operation of productive assets and their
related enterprises, whether by direct grants, loans,
or other expenditures;
* The government of the PRC seeks to utilize idle
Chinese savings and to employ that liberated
investment capital on Chinese national economic
development, while at the same time stopping or
dissuading the flight of available domestic capital to
finance development external to China;
* The government of the PRC seeks to use global capital
markets to finance the development of its industrial
firms, but in a way that cedes little or no governance
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role for, or accountability to, such foreign providers of
capital;
* If absolute state "ownership" of key productive assets
cannot be maintained, then at least absolute state
''control" must be maintained; and
* Whatever mechanism for the financing of state-owned
assets is employed, it must conform to what is
perceived of as "modernity" and "global practice" and
eventually must comply with transnational public and
private law norms and obligations, and thus-if only
for an initial appeal to global capital markets-cannot
be too exotic or sui generis.
Second, consider some of the key elements of the resulting
architecture put in place to serve the above-described policy
aspirations (and "enterprise" here should be read to include
"enterprise group"):
* Promotion of the enterprise by the state, using
generally applicable state legal norms, but those
which apply only to state controlled investments (the
WSOC form), or if others (the PRC Company Law)
with an underlying capital structure that directly
enables the state's maintenance of its incumbent
control position and the open exploitation of minority
investors;
* Donation of hard assets to the enterprise by the state
in exchange for a controlling equity position in the
new enterprise and monopoly franchise or extraction
rights conferred on the enterprise to ensure revenues
and the exclusion of competitors, domestic or foreign;
* Direct financial support from the state to the
enterprise via additional equity capitalization (e.g.,
the successive recapitalizations of PRC commercial
banks and the transfer of non-performing loans to the
balance sheets of Asset Management Companies
(AMCs)), loans by state controlled lenders (which
ripen into grants, or are transferred off balance sheet
as non-performing loans for AMCs), direct grants,
subsidies, regulatory (or tax) exemptions, preferential
prices for inputs provided by other state-controlled
enterprises, etc.;
* Management of enterprises by Party State
nomenklatura personnel who are not appointed
because of expertise in the specific industrial or
service provision sector and respond to national
development plans and priorities rather than
enterprise efficiency or investor wealth maximization,
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all as they seek bureaucratic (Party State)
advancement, for which enterprise efficiency or
productivity is mostly irrelevant;
* Raising equity investment from a body of widely
dispersed, passive, and information-deprived
investors via domestic and global capital markets,
with initial assurances: (i) for domestic and global
investors, that the enterprise is too important to fail
and will benefit from continuing state protection and
support; and (perhaps contrarily) (ii) for foreign
investors, that the state will stand back from undue
intervention in enterprise operations management,
notwithstanding the state's role in promotion of the
enterprise, the ceding of monopoly or exclusive
franchise rights grants, direct subsidies or soft loans,
etc.;
* The promise, and enforcement of, monopoly franchise
rights over (or participation in a monopoly covering) a
certain activity or revenue stream, and strict
prohibition against new entrants, domestic or foreign;
* Something like a guaranteed return for non-state
investors, at least in terms of equity appreciation (and
if the capital markets betray that promise, direct
intervention in those markets to support equity
prices); and
* After establishment and capital markets financing
gained on promises of lack of state intervention,
migration back towards state- (or Party State insider)
dominated governance of the enterprise.
III. THE FIRM IN CHINESE HISTORY
The immediately preceding Part II has generalized the
structures and key elements shared by the products of the PRC's
post-1980 "corporatization without privatization" project. Part III lays
out some of the structures and key elements seen at Chinese firms or
proto-firms from a much earlier time, specifically after the mid-
nineteenth century, a period in which Chinese imperial rule ended
forever, and the Chinese nation endured almost half a century of
intense political instability, warlord contest or civil war, foreign
intervention, and eventually invasion.
Specifically, Part III describes the following kinds of firm or
enterprise organization in China from the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries: (i) the guandu shangban ("official-promoted,
merchant-operated") enterprises (transitioned to guanshang heban
("official and merchant jointly operated") enterprises) from the latter
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part of the nineteenth century; and (ii) so-called regional enterprises
like former Qing official Zhang Jian's government-promoted but
finally privately operated Da Sheng textile group of enterprises.
Regrettably, Part III does not address other important
commercial establishments in Chinese history, namely: (i) large
enterprises with national scope that were not promoted or
maintained by the court or state, and/or understood as "family"
enterprises; and (ii) so-called charitable trusts, an innovation
stretching back to the Song Dynasty. This exposition unavoidably
relies upon the excellent scholarship of a number of modern China
historians33 but also focuses upon select elements that correlate well
to the PRC's Reform era corporate enterprises, the real focus of this
Article.
There are, however, two things to note at the outset. First, it
may be deeply misleading to refer to firm establishments in Qing,
Provisional Republican, Beiyang Government, Guomindang (KMT)
Republican, pre-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, or post Third
Plenum, pre-1992 Communist Party-ruled China as "companies" or
"corporations," etc. That terminology may cause a misapprehension
for readers, who will map the broader meanings of those essentially
Western and legal terms of art-or the specific accepted elements of
the corporate form (limited liability, centralized management,
separation of ownership and managements, perpetual life, freely
transferrable share capital)-onto radically different enterprise
structures and groups. As noted below, many of the guandu shangban
enterprises are commonly translated as the "XXX Company," even
though there was no company law or regulation in existence at the
time and thus no legal basis for the form. These entities did not have
distinct legal personality or limited liability and indeed used a
Chinese character in their name (jU), indicating that they were more
closely akin to a government department used as a vehicle to match
something like private investment and management alongside state
investment. While Chinese intellectuals and officials have certainly
appreciated the Western model of the corporate enterprise, what has
33. See WELLINGTON K.K. CHAN, MERCHANTS, MANDARINS AND MODERN
ENTERPRISE IN LATE CH'ING CHINA (1977); SHERMAN COCHRAN, BIG BUSINESS IN
CHINA: SINO-FOREIGN RIVALRY IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY, 1890-1930 (1980)
[hereinafter Cochran, 1980]; SHERMAN COCHRAN, ENCOUNTERING CHINESE NETWORKS:
WESTERN, JAPANESE AND CHINESE CORPORATIONS IN CHINA, 1880-1937 (2000)
[hereinafter COCHRAN, 2000]; DOU JIANMIN, ZHONGGUO GONGSIZHI SIXIANG YANJTU
(1842-1996) [A STUDY OF CHINA'S COMPANY SYSTEM THOUGHT - 1842-1996] (1999);
ELIZABETH KOLL, FROM COTTON MILL TO BUSINESS EMPIRE - THE EMERGENCE OF
REGIONAL ENTERPRISES IN MODERN CHINA (2004); Chi-Kong Lai, The Qing State and
Merchant Enterprise: The China Merchant's Company, 1872-1902, in To ACHIEVE
SECURITY AND WEALTH: THE QING IMPERIAL STATE AND THE ECONOMY, 1644-1911, at
139 (1992); Kenneth Pomeranz, 'Traditional" Chinese Business Forms Revisited:
Family, Firm and Financing in the History of the Yutang Company of Jining, 1779-
1956, in 18 LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 1 (1997); Kirby, supra note 14; Zelin, supra note 14.
978 [VOL50:967
CORPORATIZATION WITHOUT PRIVATIZATION
appeared through history in China is an enterprise form that is
decidedly not a transplant and is utterly distinct from those models,
except with respect to certain mechanisms deemed useful-e.g.,
widely dispersed investment to accumulate funds on a large scale and
from a relatively disempowered and collective action-challenged body
of participants.
Second, many of the enterprise structures described below had
little engagement with "law" per se; instead, they were structures
that existed and occasionally thrived either without the benefit of
authorization in state law or in direct contravention of state law
when it was enacted. As historian Bill Kirby has recited in detail,34
China only gained its first analogue to a company law statute near
the end of imperial rule (the Qing court's Gongsilt of 1904), a specific
and explicitly legal norm hardly used in practice. Much the same fate
awaited successor company laws and regulations (of 1914, 1929, and
1946 under Beiyang Government and pre- and post-Anti-Japanese
War KMT governments respectively)3 5 that the state, company
promoters, and entrepreneurs certainly engaged with more fully than
at any prior time in Chinese history, but not in the ways another
political-legal system might dictate.
At least for the Chinese sector of the economy, the state (at that
time, the Qing court) led new industrial development in the
nineteenth century.36 Most historians of China tie the outsized role of
the state in matters pertaining to economic development, and a
minimal private sector, to a Confucian (rujia) orthodoxy hostile to
commerce and trade. While this Article recognizes the rhetorical
power of that oft-articulated Confucian hostility, the greater and
determinative power of a surviving Legalist (fajia) obsession with the
state's pursuit of "wealth and power" was the wellspring of heavy
state involvement in first agricultural and then industrial and
commercial pursuits, and certainly large scale projects critical to
national economic development and rearmament against foreign
threats.3 7 Indeed, in the long course of Chinese imperial history, it
34. See Kirby, supra note 14, at 44 (explaining that prior to 1904, China had no
commercial code, nor civil code, and could regulate economic activity only through the
Great Qing Code, which was primarily a penal code).
35. Id.
36. Before the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895,
foreigners were not permitted to establish manufacturing enterprises in China (even in
the so-called "Treaty Ports" where the rights granted to foreign powers were "trading"
rights). The weakened Qing government ignored small-scale foreign-owned enterprises
in non-essential sectors (e.g., shipbuilding and repair), but was strict in enforcing the
ban on large, capital-intensive industry (e.g., cotton spinning and weaving). The Treaty
of Shimonoseki, and rights therafter gained by other foreign powers (and their agents)
as a result of "most favored nation" clauses in the prior Qing treaties, changed all of
that.
37. See generally HAN FEIZI, HAN FEIZI (Burton Watson ed., trans., Columbia
University Press 2003) (280-233 BCE); BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ, THE WORLD OF
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seems that few have seriously questioned the necessity of an active
and interventionist state, with the governing elite, Han or foreign
(Mongol or Manchu), instead questioning the nature and extent of
such state involvement. So it was that by the middle and late
nineteenth century, after the serial trauma of the "unequal treaties"
resulting from the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion, etc., no
official could consider expansion of the economy and industrial
development except under close state supervision. This basic
assumption gave rise to at least two important premises which have
continued life more than a hundred years later and in a vastly
different global circumstance: (i) that the state had the right to run,
or at least intervene in, the affairs of any major business enterprise,
and (ii) that the state and ultimately its officials had a preferred right
over the returns from such an enterprise (certainly over non-state
providers of capital).
Thus, the need for huge amounts of capital for projects designed
to make China "rich and powerful" (again), the government's inability
or unwillingness to provide that capital, the desire to protect against
incursion by capital-rich, foreign-run enterprises, and the aim of
employing idle Chinese capital or constraining its flight to fund
external development, all spurred the Qing court-but really
individual state officials-to create or allow new investment and
business structures, chief among them the joining of official
promotion and private investment known as "guandu shangban" or
"official-promoted, merchant-operated."38
The guandu shangban enterprises started in the 1870s actually
have their roots in entirely government-funded and -managed-thus
"guanban"-operations of the 1860s in sectors directly relevant to
what is now called national security-e.g., shipyards and arsenals.
The new enterprises of the 1870s were designed to be active in areas
traditionally occupied by some level of private entrepreneurs
(Chinese and foreign)-e.g., textiles and shipping-and where there
was an established state interest or monopoly-e.g., mining.39 Li
Hongzhang, for a time the most powerful Qing official and the
political mastermind behind the first guandu shangban firm, China
Merchants' Steam Navigation Company (lunchuan zhaoshangju)
(CMS), neatly merged two ideas-the established imperial Chinese
THOUGHT IN ANCIENT CHINA 321-349 (Belknap Press 1985); SHANG YANG, THE BOOK
OF LORD SHANG (J.J.L. Duyvendak ed., trans., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2011)
(390-338 BCE).
38. I differ here from the accepted English translation of "guandu shangban,"
usually rendered as "government supervised-merchant managed," because that
translation implies more ongoing state supervision - rather than initial promotion -
than I think was originally envisioned. However, as there was constant flux in the
balance between state involvement and enterprise (investor) autonomy per both state
policy and the identity of the officials or managers involved, my term may over-
privilege Li Hongzhang's original rhetorical promise for these enterprises.
39. See CHAN, supra note 33, at 70.
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bureaucratic construct utilized in the salt monopoly (actually called
guandu shangban) and a very partial model of the Western European
joint stock company-to advocate for a new kind of enterprise in the
late Qing.40 The salt monopoly program was useful because it showed
a precedent for co-opting wealthy "merchants" (non-officials with
private capital and business experience) to provide capital and
management skills.41 The joint stock model-a relatively new
Western legal mechanism then much encountered at the hands of
European companies active on the China coast (e.g., British American
Tobacco) but also known domestically and from Chinese diaspora
enterpriseS4 2-was deemed useful as a vehicle for raising huge
amounts of capital from a large number of dispersed investors
(without, it is important to note, any vision of shareholders' meetings,
a centralized and elected board of directors with fiduciary duties to
the merchant investors, or (merchant-representing) board appointed
senior management, etc.).43
Notwithstanding this state (at this time, "court") innovation, a
bedrock fact of industrial development in pre-1895 China remained-
no moderate- to large-scale manufacturing enterprise could be
established without the approval and support (which, as described
below, took many forms) of a senior official. So it was that the first
new large-scale industrial enterprises established in China with any
private involvement, such as those seen in armaments, mines,
shipping, and shipyards, were created under government sponsorship
and the imprimatur of a specific court official. There are many
examples of the so-called guandu shangban enterprise
establishments in the nineteenth century, including the Hanyeping
Company, the Hengfeng Spinning Mill, the Shanghai Cotton Cloth
Mill, the Kaiping Mining Company, and CMS, all of which were
created without sanction in state law, regulation, or indeed any
formal utterance from the Qing court or bureaucracy, but each of
which is identified with the concrete patronage of a specific
government personality.
40. See id.
41. The imperial salt administration's policy construct allowed the
appointment of wealthy merchants to act as "chief merchants" (zongshang), which
merchant managers were actually given official (government) rank to run operations
with broad administrative power over both lesser private salt shippers but even other
officials administering the same network. CHAN, supra note 33, at 71.
42. See COCHRAN 2000, supra note 33, at 58; Pomerantz, supra note 33, at 2.
43. Traditional enterprises in China that correlated with at least the
possibilities inherent in the joint stock form at this point were smaller in scale, usually
dependent upon the resources of an extended family or a few partners, and -
importantly - managed by hired (non-family) managers. The formal owners or
investors in such enterprises ceded a great deal of control to the hired managers, with
little intervention in enterprise management or reporting demands. If the hired
managers failed, they could be fired, but replaced by new stranger managers with the
same management independence and power. See Chan, supra note 33, at 71.
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The traditional view of the guandu shangban establishments in
the late Qing was that they suffered from "state" (court) interference,
notwithstanding real indications of growth in China's late nineteenth
century productive economy and a lack of substantial impact by the
state generally in that growth story.44
To understand the specific role of the state vis-A-vis such firms,
and to be able to compare the role of the state with respect to such
nineteenth century firms and the PRC's corporatized SOEs of today,
it is useful to analyze in granular detail the state policy framework
for the creation-really court permission for the allowance-and
operation of such entities and how that changed over time.
As noted above, the guandu shangban firm establishments were
occasioned by the following imperatives:
* The need for large amounts of capital for projects
designed to make China "rich and powerful";
* The government's inability or unwillingness to
provide that needed capital;
* The protection against, and the creation of
competitors for, capital- and technology-rich foreign
invested enterprises with their eyes on China's
domestic markets and pre-established dominance of
external markets; and
* The employment of idle Chinese capital on domestic
infrastructure projects (and/or stopping the flight of
domestic capital to finance development projects
external to China).
Or as the CMS patron Li Hongzhang wrote in a December 1872 letter
to a comrade official Zhang Shusheng about the promotion of CMS
explicitly dismissing the importance (for the state) of its monopoly
over domestic waterways transport of tribute rice:
The use of steamships for the transport of tribute rice by sea route is but a
minor consideration. The project will open up new prospects for the dignity of
the state, for commerce, for revenue, and for military strength for China for
hundreds of years to come.
4 5
What characterized the organization and operations of the
guandu shangban and the relationship of the state to these
enterprises? Here, one needs to understand different phases of the
guandu shangban style of enterprise, different phases that are
identifiable even before the increasingly desperate Qing state (and its
officials) reversed course and pushed their way back into direct
involvement in the operation of these enterprises for what became
44. See, e.g., Lai, supra note 33, at 139-40.
45. Id. at 142.
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known as guanshang heban (or "co-operation by merchants and the
state") and the choice between final retrenchment to pure state
ownership and operation (guanban) or total letting go to entirely
merchant-operated (shang ban) structures. In the initial phase of the
initiative, one can identify the following:
* The promotion of the enterprise by the Qing court,
and a powerful individual official connected to the
court, all without authorization in public legal or
regulatory norms (as compared to firm internal
regulations, or written "instructions" from the
promoting official); 46
* The donation of hard assets (e.g., steamships,
factories, etc.) or franchise or extraction rights (e.g.,
coastal shipping or coal mining, etc.) by the state to
the firm, gratis, as a loan ripening into an outright
grant, for a fixed (and low) use fee, or in exchange for
an equity interest in the firm held by the court, or
more likely the powerful official or his confederates as
proxies;47
* The raising of finance from domestic capital
(merchant) sources,4 8 with a preference for state co-
investment via loans instead of equity, with the
promise ex ante that the Qing court would stand back
on management and operations notwithstanding its
promotion, monopoly grants, direct subsidies, or loan-
funding;
* The promise, and subsequently grant of, subsidies to
the enterprise by the state, which might come in the
46. For example, after 1873, CMS had rules (jugui) and regulations
(zhangcheng) which operated much as modern "articles of association" or By-Laws do,
and CMS was the subject and recipient of hundreds of "instructions" from Li
Hongzhang, all at a time when there was no statutory basis for the firm, and Li also
appointed top management of the firm. See Lai, supra note 33, at 144-45.
47. Sheng Xuanhuai's April 1872 scheme for the promotion of CMS proposed
that the future firm acquire steamships from the state shipyard at a fixed, preferential
rental, and attract merchant participation by giving the new firm (and by extension its
private investors) a participation in what had previously been the state monopoly on
transportation of tribute rice. See id. at 143-44.
48. Those who understand Chinese will comprehend this aspect of the guandu
shangban firm immediately from the formal Chinese name for CMS, which name has
nil connection with the common English name used for the enterprise-"China
Merchant Steam Navigation Company, Ltd." The Chinese term, lunchuan
zhaoshangju, indicates that the firm is: the "[government] department" (id) for
attracting (zhao) investment from non-state sources (shang) for steamships
(lunchuan)." Most of the other guandu shangban establishments referred to here also
used the Chinese character 'jii" for "[state] department," for example the Kaiping
Mines (Kaiping Kuangwuju) and the Mohe Gold Mine (Mohe Jinkuangju).
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form of loans at preferential interest rates4 9 or no
interest (the proceeds of which might often be used to
pay down higher interest private extensions of
credit),5 0 with no expectation of repayment of
principal or a concrete understanding that interest
would be forgiven,5 ' or the lease of hard assets from
the state at a fixed (and low) price, etc., all justified
because these apparently merchant- or privately
operated and benefiting firms had an important
public and not just commercial function (e.g., coastal
shipping, mining, armaments);
* The promise, and enforcement of, monopoly franchise
rights over (or participation in a monopoly covering) a
certain activity or revenue stream, and strict
prohibition against new entrants, domestic or
foreign;52
* The operational management of the enterprise left in
the hands of non-officials (merchants) after
promotion;5 3
* The guaranteed, and government-enforced,
preferential revenue rate for firm business, often with
that preferred return from the firm arising in an area
49. The interest rate on the abundant state loans directed to CMS (more than
half of the firm's borrowings) paid out between 7-10%, always lower than the
guaranteed dividend paid to merchant investors of 10%. Lai, supra note 33, at 145.
50. With respect to CMS specifically, see id. at 144-46 (detailing how CMS was
originally promoted in October 1872 with a government loan sourced in the
appropriation by Li Hongzhang of 135,000 taels of Zhili military funds, and showing at
least 18 state loans subsequently to CMS before 1885, all a result of pressure brought
to bear on officials in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Hubei, and customs officials in Tianjin and
Shanghai); indeed, Lai's study shows that before 1882, CMS' state loans were much
larger than the firm's actual paid-in capital (2.2 times larger than the maximum paid
in capital).
51. For CMS, in 1877 Li Hongzhang obtained the permission of the Qing court
to suspend interest payable on government loans for 3 years, and in the event, no
interest whatsoever was paid on these loans between 1882 and 1885, the foregone
interest equaling almost half of CMS' paid-in capital between 1882 and 1893. Id. at
145-46.
52. For instance, Li Hongzhang pressured Qing officials to consign a portion of
the annual shipment of tribute rice to CMS, and, as noted infra, at a rate two to three
times higher than the rate charged even by foreign steamship companies hauling
ordinary freight. Id. at 146-47.
53. This was always deemed to be a critical proffer on the part of the Qing
court, as demonstrated by Li Hongzhang's failure to successfully promote CMS in
October 1872 because of appointment of an official to management (Zhu Qiang), and
then successful promotion of the firm once two comprador-merchants Tang Jingxing
and Xu Run were installed as the top managers (which function they performed until
1884). Id. at 144.
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of business closed to other commercial firms, domestic
or foreign;54 and
* The guaranteed, preferred, "above the line" return to
"merchant" equity investors, thus regardless of any
net profits from the enterprise.55
In 1883, Qing court policy changed significantly, such that the
state effectively replaced merchant management (the "shangban"
part of "guandu shangban") with bureaucratic or state management
(or "guanban").56 A decade later, after the 1895 Treaty of
Shimonoseki and the serious challenge presented by foreign
industrial firms permitted to undertake manufacturing operations on
Chinese soil, circumstances changed even more radically and private
Chinese involvement in industry became far more active. While some
purely private (shangban) enterprises and wholly state-owned
(guanban) enterprises continued to exist, for enterprises involving the
state late period Qing officials made increasing use of an enterprise
form giving the state more power than it notionally possessed under
the guandu shangban model: the "state and merchant co-operated"
(guanshang heban) enterprise.57 The new form was either promoted
initially as such or developed on the framework of a prior guandu
shangban enterprise where the state or "official" side encroached on
the "merchant" side.
Indeed, this is part of the story for Li Hongzhang's CMS, which
after the 1880s saw diversion of firm revenues to activities of a
decidedly non-commercial nature and increasing official involvement,
leading to merchant rejection and then privatization but with
ownership and management ceded into the hands of former officials
(or incumbent officials acting in their private interest). So, CMS,
which had inaugurated government business cooperation in 1872,
was successfully operated with real commercial autonomy until 1884
but was then subject to dominating government influence and
direction from 1884 to 1895.58 Initially, Qing officials proposed that
the government take over CMS not because it was failing, but
because it was making such a profit for its merchant investors
(benefiting from the subsidies, monopoly rights, and preferences
54. For instance, the rate CMS was able to charge for the transport of tribute
rice forced upon local officials, a rate rewarding the most expensive provider, or two to
three times higher than the rate charged even by foreign steamship companies hauling
ordinary freight. Id. at 146-47.
55. For example, the initial (and very generous) 10% fixed annual dividend
offered to CMS investors in that firm's promotion stage. Id. at 144.
56. Zelin, supra note 14, at 632.
57. See CHAN, supra note 33, at 238-39 (discussing the shift to the guanshang
heban model).
58. See id. at 17 (citing research indicating that CMS tried to consolidate
government-business cooperation between 1972 and 1884, but remained under
government influence in following years).
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detailed above).5 9 Indeed, there was significant pressure from high
Qing level officials for a government takeover of CMS as early as
1877 (by Shen Baozhen, governor general of Liangjiang),60 1879 (by
Ye Tingjuan, a tribute-grain manager inside CMS but also an official
(a Shanghai daotai)),61 and 1881 (by Liu Kunyi, successor to Shen as
governor-general of Liangjiang).62 All of these efforts were
successfully resisted, and the government-appointed comprador-
background managers of CMS (Xu Run and Tang Tingshu) became
the most significant shareholders of CMS in the late 1870s and early
1880s.6 However, these forays by powerful officials in the direction of
state takeover certainly altered the merchant (now non-manager
investor) view of the viability of CMS and its future autonomy. By the
early to mid-1880s, the failure of the Cixi Dowager Empress to invest
in the Qing empire's defenses, the weakening of Li Hongzhang's
political position, and the financial crisis of 1883 made it very difficult
for the court to support a non-state operated enterprise like CMS.
Accordingly, the CMS merchant managers were replaced by sitting
officials, and the enterprise was used by the state for its own, often
non-commercial, purposes (such as funding the Beiyang defense
forces, even transferring shipping personnel from CMS to the
Beiyang Navy).64 This change was clearly signaled to China's non-
state affiliated, private or "merchant" investors by the alteration in
the Chinese language names given the newly-appointed managers.
Whereas comprador Tang Tingshu was called "chief manager"
(zongban) of both CMS and the Kaiping Mining Company-an
appellation with slight color of official status-when he was
succeeded by Sheng Xuanhuai (still a sitting government official) and
later by Qing bannerman (and also sitting official) Zhang Yanmo at
the Kaiping mines, the "chief manager" title was discontinued, and
instead Sheng and Zhang were called "director generals" or "du ban,"
a Chinese language title which in the imperial era clearly indicated a
government status and role.65 That shift in turn led to a rise in
corruption and poor performance at CMS, as the enterprise was
unable to resist significant government intervention. After 1885, and
following the financial crisis in Shanghai of 1883, CMS was
effectively reorganized, with Sheng Xuanhuai-always a sitting
official (daotai of Chefu and Tianjin at different times) but by 1885
the largest shareholder of CMS-appointed director general of the
firm. 6 6 At the same time, all merchant or investor directors were




63. Id. at 144.
64. Id. at 150; Zelin, supra note 14, at 632.
65. CHAN, supra note 33, at 75.
66. Id. at 74-75.
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removed from their positions (in part because they had lost their
capital during the 1883 crash), and Sheng appointed his insiders
(mostly officials) to the company directorate.6 7 Finally, and somewhat
ironically, CMS was facially "privatized"-with control ceded to
Sheng Xuanhuai and his group and removed from Li Hongzhang and
his "merchant" managers-but in fact taken over by bureaucratic
officials acting in their own pecuniary and bureaucratic interest.68
Predictably, perhaps, CMS never again performed as well as in the
period when it benefited from a unique balance between government
financial support and enterprise autonomy, suffering instead from
the withdrawal of state financial support and an increase in
bureaucratic control of its operations.69
The same transition was visited upon another of Li Hongzhang's
guandu shangban enterprises, the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill in
1887, and by the same official acting in an enterprise capacity.70 In
that year, Sheng Xuanhuai took over the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill
and tripled its capital account but, tellingly, by taking more
government loans and by the diversion of the CMS funds he now
controlled.7' Thus, even by the late 1880s, the government was
looking at already promoted enterprises-where the government's
role had been advertised as mere "supervision" (or "promotion"), weak
in the face of simultaneously offered private ("merchant")
management-as subordinate divisions (and not independent legal
persons or accounting units), which the government could capitalize
directly or allocate capital investment freely between. By the end of
the nineteenth century, and after a fire destroyed much of the
Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill's original mill, Sheng converted the
enterprise into yet another purely guandu (government operated)
enterprise, but with funding solely from himself and a group of his
associates.72 He tried to raise public investment for that iteration of
the enterprise, which failed entirely as non-state investors were
justifiably worried about investing in an industrial enterprise run by
the state. So, he took over the enterprise under an assumed name and
made it entirely private (but given his official background and roles,
"private" in the sense that it was funded and operated by individuals
67. Id. at 75.
68. See FEUERWERKER, supra note 15, at 137-44 (citing contemporary criticism
of Sheng Xuanhuai's simultaneous management of CMS and tending to his official
duties); see also Lai, supra note 33, at 149.
69. Lai, supra note 33, at 151.
70. CHAN, supra note 33, at 74.
71. See, e.g., id. (describing Sheng's takeover of Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill in
1887, and how he quickly tripled its capital using government loans and the transfer of
some CMS funds he controlled).
72. Id.
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with official backgrounds and roles but acting outside of their
government statuses).7
Wellington Chan summarized the shared process of merchant
(private capital) disillusionment thus:
Merchant disenchantment with the [guandu shangban] type of enterprise
stemmed from replacement of merchant-managers by men of bureaucratic
background. The merchant investors had not been deterred by their lack of
voice in company policies (in fact, one suspects that all of the large
shareholders or their friends became directors and managers). But they began
to shy away from further investment when they became convinced, rightly or
wrongly, that government bureaucrats were in control and making use of their
capital for bureaucratic and personal ends. . . . [The] early [iterations of the
guandu shangban form] fulfilled [Li Hongzhang]'s intention to use merchant
capital at the merchant's own risk. From the 1880s, however, as these
operations passed into the hands of official-managers and their merchant
assistants, and as new ones were founded without responsible merchant-
managers, merchant capital too, was conspicuously absent.
7 4
This increasingly mixed picture of ownership and operational
management, and the relative abandonment of the guandu shangban
model, can be seen across the late Qing landscape and in the run-up
to the demise of that last imperial dynasty. As Elizabeth K611 reports
for just the mining sector-an industrial sector the central
government might have had a strong interest in for both industrial
development and defense reasons-the period between 1895 and 1911
saw thirty-five enterprises founded as fully private firms (shangban),
compared to nine owned by the government alone (guanban), two as
government-promoted merchant-operated (guandu shangban), and
ten as government-merchant co-operated (guanshang heban).75 Of
course, one of the sharp ironies of this imposed transition from
guandu shangban to any of guanshang heban, orthodox guanban,
guanban run for the private interest of officials and their cronies, or
full "privatization" (but really delivery of the enterprise into the
hands of specific officials), was that finally the enterprises were
unable to attract domestic Chinese capital investment-the basic
point of the guandu shangban establishments in the first place-and
thus had to rely on foreign loans, leading to the inevitable foreign
takeover of strategic Chinese assets later, a takeover which the
guandu shangban initiative was supposed to protect against.76
73. Id. at 74-75.
74. Id. at 75-76.
75. KOLL, supra note 33, at 16.
76. See Letter from Li Hongzhang to Zhang Shusheng (Dec. 11, 1972), in Lai,
supra note 33, at 142, and accompanying text. Wellington Chan recites an example of
this unanticipated and deeply undesirable consequence with respect to the Kaiping
mines. Upon ex-comprador and non-official manager Tang Tingshu's death in 1892,
and the Kaiping operation coming under the power of Qing bannerman and official
Zhang Yanmo, corruption and fast advancing bureaucratization commenced. Chan
then cites to Ellsworth Carlson's work to show that while Tang was in charge, the
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The late stage proffer of a legal basis for incorporation and
registration, legal personality, and limited liability represented by
the Qing government's 1904 Gongsibi only accelerated increased
involvement of no longer court-tied and thus apparently "private"
actors in the financing and operation of important industrial
enterprises, as will be seen below in the story of Zhang Jian's Da
Sheng." Importantly, however, the availability of incorporation
provided a vehicle enabling state officials to first gain governance
power over state assets but then leave the public sector, along with
the assets entrusted to their care and management.
Koll writes about a second genus of Chinese enterprise
establishment apparent after 1895, what she calls the "regional
enterprise"-an evolution of the government sponsored or state co-
operated company in the direction of a privately controlled business,
but not to the full extent of a traditional Chinese family-owned
business (as originated or maintained). As K611 writes in the
introduction to her book-length treatment of Zhang Jian's
paradigmatic regional enterprise, the Da Sheng group of businesses:
Originally designed as motors for industrial development, they were formed by
privatization of government enterprises. However, even these incorporated
enterprises exhibited many of the managerial characteristics of the family
business. . . . Before 1895 regional enterprises were nonexistent; by the time
they came to be promoted, the imperial government had already been
weakened by war and social disorder. Although [Da Sheng] was founded as a
joint government-private venture, government involvement became negligible
after the first five years and finally redundant when the company acquired
legal status as a shareholding company in 1907. The government never played
a role in the management or ownership of the company, but Zhang Jian and his
family did, though without ever turning [Da Sheng] into a family business.7 8
It is these regional enterprises that-along with the guandu
shangban transitioning into guanshang heban enterprises described
above-have perhaps the most to teach us about the path dependency
of China's enterprises, especially when the governing national regime
is weak or failing.
K611's impressive history of the Da Sheng enterprise group and
its development from 1895 to its demise in the mid-twentieth century
is extraordinarily rich in detail and evocative of the way in which
semi-private enterprise developed in China through the end of the
Kaiping mines operations were funded by merchant investment. Under Tang's
successor Zhang, merchant investors would not invest, forcing Kaiping to rely on
foreign loans, opening the way for absolute foreign control afterwards. CHAN, supra
note 33, at 75-76. This is why the Kaiping Mines are still referred to today in China as
"British" mines.
77. See KOLL, supra note 33, at 124-125 (describing how in 1895 the
Dagongbao newspaper published announcements of approved and registered
companies, satisfying the official company registration required by the Company Law
[Gongsilti]).
78. Id. at 18.
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nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century.7 9 This
Article necessarily gives too short shrift to that compelling detail and
focuses instead on aspects of the Da Sheng development-and Zhang
Jian's personal role in promoting and managing it-which have direct
resonance for the PRC's corporatized SOE groups today.
Following is a rendition in summary terms of those elements:
First, the impetus for the promotion of Da Sheng was public and
governmental, not private and entrepreneurial. Indeed, the
entrepreneurial personality involved (Zhang Jian) only
metamorphosed away from his official identity with the development
of the enterprise. In fact, the share certificates distributed for the Da
Sheng enterprise between 1897 and 1907 were emblazoned with
Zhang Jian's name, with no allusion to his enterprise post, but
instead a prominent broadcasting of his full official title (of Hanlin
Scholar, or "hanlinyuan xiuzhuan").80 As with high Qing official Li
Hongzhang's inauguration of the paradigmatic guandu shangban
establishments, the original driver of the Da Sheng promotion effort
was Zhang Zhidong, then governor-general of the Liangjiang
Provinces (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) and imperial commissioner of the
southern ports and-with the demise of Li Hongzhang-the most
powerful official in the Qing court. It was Zhang Zhidong who in late
1895 contacted officials in the Suzhou and Zhenjiang prefectures and
the Tongzhou department and asked them to recruit local merchants
to establish manufacturing facilities for local goods.8 ' Zhang
Zhidong's explicit policy aim was to resist "the plans of the foreigners"
(Westerners and Japanese) after the Treaty of Shimonoseki permitted
them to establish manufacturing businesses in China and outside of
the treaty ports.8 2 Zhang Jian, then still a Qing official who received
this governmental instruction from his bureaucratic superior to
search out promoters and start-up capital from the private sector, in
turn liaised directly with six promoters active in Guangzhou
(Canton), Fujian, Ningbo, Shanghai, Nantong (eventually the site of
the origins of the Da Sheng group), and Haimen.8 3 Initially, each of
these promoters committed to investment (or bundling of investment
from associates) in a cotton mill operation that still sitting official
Zhang Jian pronounced would be entirely "shangban" (merchant-
79. A great deal of the expositive material following is extracted from K611's
history of Da Sheng.
80. See KOLL, supra note 33, at 67, 70 (Noting that this presentational aspect
proved changeable, as circumstances required and China saw the demise of imperial
rule by scholar officials. For instance, on the 1918 graduation certificate for the Da
Sheng-established Nantong Textile School, Zhang Jian is pictured in a Western suit
and with a cropped, Western-style, moustache, an image of a Westernized "modernizer"
as distinct from the traditional imperial scholar official as possible).
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 63-64.
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operated), with the promoters listed on an imperial document as
'jingli dongshi" (managers or managing directors).84
Second, the enterprise was finally established and able to
operate in its early years only because it had to backtrack on its
proposed "private" or "merchant" identity and rely directly on state
(Qing court) capitalization and involvement. This reversal became
necessary when the original Guangzhou, Fujian, and Shanghai
promoters backed out and definitively changed the future enterprise
into a far more local regional effort in terms of both capital raising
and operations. More importantly, Zhang Jian as the official and
direct godfather of the project found that he could not raise sufficient
capital to purchase the machinery needed for manufacturing
operations, which under the original plan was to be purchased with
the proceeds of the defecting Shanghai-origin cash investment.8 5
Thus, Zhang Jian had to appeal to the state for financing support and
to obtain the key capital equipment required to commence operations.
This appeal came at a very tricky time, and was indicative of how
important specific personal official patronage was, because of Zhang
Zhidong's resumption of the governor-generalship of the Huguang
provinces and his replacement as governor-general of the Liangjiang
provinces by an entirely different official, Liu Kunyi. Liu was
apparently sympathetic to Zhang Jian's plight but could not in the
end arrange financing for the necessary equipment purchase.86 This
resulted in a renewed intervention by the real official-in-interest,
Zhang Zhidong, who contributed second-hand English manufacturing
equipment originally purchased by the government under Zhang
Zhidong's direction for a planned cotton mill in distant Wuchang but
since warehoused in Shanghai.87 Zhang Jian and the Qing state
agreed that the contribution of equipment would be booked as state
capital investment, comprising fully 50 percent of the capitalization of
the future Da Sheng mill, with the remainder of the capital to be
contributed by private investors.8 8 Thus, even in the planning stages
the future enterprise had metamorphosed from being explicitly
"shangban" to a paradigmatic "guanshang heban" enterprise (and
something very close to what is seen today in a corporatized SOE
with a percentage of public capital markets investment/float, where
productive capital has been contributed by the state and is matched
with non-state investment now procured through modern capital
markets).8 9 Over time, this state investment of secondhand foreign
84. Id. at 64.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 64-65.
88. Id. at 65.
89. K611 relates the story of a side deal that Zhang Jian tried to bring off when
he immediately faced difficulties raising the other 50% of the planned capitalization for
the enterprise from non-state sources, and which also has resonance in the modern
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equipment was effectively appropriated from the state by the
enterprise. How? Until 1908, the last year before Da Sheng's
corporatization under law, the court-donated equipment was listed on
the enterprise accounts as "official machinery capital" (guan ji gu
chengben) to indicate that it was the fruits of a capital contribution by
the largest investor, the state.9 0 After 1908, it was listed simply as
"machinery capital" (i chengben) on the books of Da Sheng (even
though the accounting category of "state contributed machinery"
(guan ji) continued to exist), the state was no longer an investor in
the corporatized entity or able to collect profit share from Da Sheng
for the capital it had contributed and equity it should have received
in return, and there is no evidence that Da Sheng or any investor in
Da Sheng actually purchased the machinery from the state.91 In
effect then, a non-state enterprise, managed by non-state actors, had
appropriated significant assets of the state that had at inception
represented 100 percent of the in-kind capitalization of the firm, for
nil consideration to the state or the contributing/selling party.
Third, Zhang Jian's Da Sheng was intimately involved with
political as well as business tasks. Between 1898 and 1903, many of
the Nantong area's local cloth businesses were investors in Da Sheng.
They were both investors in the productive enterprise and key links
between industrial yarn production and cloth weaving in the locality,
as well as the historical markets of those local weavers.92 Those cloth
merchant investors included individuals who had previously lobbied
the Qing government to reduce a transit tax on commercial goods
that had hurt particularly in a slump experienced by such businesses
in the late nineteenth century.9 3 They had little success on their own,
but once they agreed to help finance the initial guanshang heban Da
Sheng, Zhang Jian-still an official, though now also in charge of a
state-invested enterprise-petitioned the court on their behalf to
PRC for the way "state" assets improperly enter the non-state owned economy: in 1897,
Zhang Jian approached the former official and later investor cum manager
extraordinaire of many prominent government sponsored enterprises in the late Qing,
Sheng Xuanhuai, for finance help. Zhang Jian's proposal was to "sell" Sheng Xuanhuai
half of the machinery contributed to Da Sheng by the government (by Zhang Zhidong
specifically) in exchange for cash (250,000 taels). In effect, Zhang was suggesting that
Da Sheng sell state assets already contributed to Da Sheng (and already recognized in
the state's 50% equity interest in Da Sheng) for cash, which cash would be recognized
as cash equity investment in Da Sheng by Sheng Xuanhuai (thus, double counting on
the equity account). All of this would allow Zhang Jian to state that he had raised
matching "private" investment for Da Sheng, even though he would have effectively
disposed of state assets to private interests (with no consideration for the state seller)
and radically diminished the productive capital of the planned enterprise. Luckily for
all concerned, this particular grab at public assets by Sheng Xuanhuai did not pan out.
See id.
90. Id. at 127.
91. Id. at 127.




relieve the burden of this tax.94 Here lies a small demonstration of
the mixture between roles and priorities, for both officials intent on
financing an enterprise and private investors seeking a public
administration benefit. Indeed, as K6ll demonstrates in her telling, as
state and official patronage-in the person of Zhang Zhidong-was
withdrawn, Zhang Jian as promoter of the Da Sheng enterprise relied
increasingly on the support of the local business community in
Nantong.9 5
Fourth, and again as already seen with respect to the initial
guandu shangban enterprises, investors in Da Sheng were the
beneficiaries not of a participation in net profits of the enterprise, but
instead of a guaranteed payment (guanli)-8 percent in the case of
Da Sheng-to be paid by the enterprise to its investors without
regard to performance of the firm or even the existence of
distributable profits-in effect then a preferred dividend or above-the-
line interest payment on a bond.96 While later the shares of Da Sheng
were traded by the Shanghai Stock Merchants Association (starting
in 1917) and the shares of Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill and No. 2
Cotton Mill were listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (from 1920),
and thus investors experienced some amount of equity risk, such
investments effectively remained fixed income investments for the
private investors who participated in the enterprise group given the
guaranteed dividend.
Fifth, the initial cotton mill that Da Sheng was promoted to own
and operate-the Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill-was merely the first
enterprise in what through the early twentieth century grew to
become a group of affiliated enterprises and offices, only some of
which were formed as legal subsidiaries, which in the end included
flour and oil mills, shipping lines, land reclamation operations, a
publishing house, and a distillery.97 These affiliated operations were
established to ensure the provision of raw materials (or the land upon
which to create the raw materials) andlor transportation facilities
and services solely or chiefly for the Da Sheng-governed cotton mills.
These affiliations (many based on ties which had nothing to do with
formal ownership), subsidiary relationships, cross-ownership, or even
interlocking directorships were maintained even after Da Sheng was
94. Id.
95. Id. at 67.
96. Id. at 67-68.
97. By 1910, and even after Da Sheng had procured limited liability company
status in 1907, the group comprised seventeen different affiliated operations, including:
the original Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill and one branch mill on Chongming Island
(established 1907); the Guansheng Oil Mill (1901); the Tonghai Land Reclamation
Company (1901); the Hanmolin Publishing House (1902); the Dalong Soap Factory
(1902); the Zisheng Iron Workshop (1905); and the Fuxin Flour Mill (1909). In 1921,
another branch mill was established in Haimen County.
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corporatized as a limited liability company under China's first
company regulation, the Qing dynasty's 1904 gongsilli.
Indeed, the corporatization of one part of the Da Sheng complex
of enterprises under "law," and the relationship of the resulting
"legal" property and ownership relationships to actual managerial
control-in particular, the way in which critical financial and
managerial control of the entire group was exercised by a Shanghai
"office" external to the formal legal network of enterprises-has close
resonance to the way in which corporatized SOE groups are run in
the modern PRC.9 8
Koll reports that the Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill's status qua a
guansheng heban enterprise was never formally annulled. The share
certificates for the enterprise issued between 1897 and 1903 all
advertised the operation's guansheng heban nature with the legend
that the Da Sheng mills "were established in Tongzhou with approval
granted by [imperial] edict in response to a memorial from the
Imperial Commissioner of the Southern Ports . . . , per contract
established in perpetuity to be jointly managed (dingli hetong
yongyuan heban) by officials and gentry."99 By March of 1905, an
announcement appeared in the Da Gong Bao newspaper indicating
that the Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill had been approved and
registered as a company (gongsi) with the Qing Commerce Ministry
(shang bu) per the 1904 companies regulation.0 0 Two years later, in
1907, the report of the first shareholders' -meeting of the Da Sheng
No. 1 Cotton Mill states that it is specifically a company limited by
shares (gufen youxian gongsi) under the 1904 Qing statute.1 0
However, after 1907 the company's share certificates never refer to
its status as a company limited by shares, and only four years after
the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911 (from 1915) stop alluding to
government involvement in what was once a guanshang heban
enterprise.102 Da Sheng's Chongming Island No. 2 Branch Mill, which
had many of the same investors as the No. 1 Cotton Mill, was
registered as a company (gongsi) with the Qing Commerce Ministry
in 1905 but not specifically a company with limited liability and with
no indication of a subsidiary relationship to the Da Sheng No. 1
Cotton Mill company limited by shares (which appears correct,
because the registered company limited by shares apparently did not
own any equity in the Chongming Island No. 2 Mill).' 0 3 As the group
grew in the early twentieth century, the Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill
as incorporated became both a holding company (holding direct equity
98. See infra text on pps. 996-1000.
99. KOLL, supra note 33, at 124-125 (Figure 5.1, showing the 1897 certificate).
100. Id. at 124.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 125.
103. Id. at 125-126.
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stakes (10 percent, 32 percent, 15 percent, and 17 percent) in, and
maintaining interlocking directorships regarding, four true
subsidiaries, and the hub of "affiliations" (for thirteen other
operationally and legally separate enterprises).104 The affiliations
grew out of common management or shareholders, investment by the
Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill acting as an investment/holding
company, financing of the affiliates in the form of "deposits" (cun) by
the Da Sheng parent, and exclusive contractual relationships
between the affiliates and the main cotton mill business. The
"deposit" transactions-whereby Da Sheng financed the affiliates
without making equity investment in other such enterprises (or, more
importantly perhaps, creating a dividend obligation) but instead by
making a donation of capital much harder to retrieve-were clearly a
way for Zhang Jian to deprive the investors in Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton
Mill from any governance power over the affiliates receiving the
"deposit" funding, as power remained in the hands of Zhang Jian and
his close associates. Here are early indications of the very fuzzy
borders between clearly affiliated and co-governed enterprises (the
same kinds of operations, with many of the same investors, governed
by the same system of human agents), but not strictly related or even
affiliated in any legal or property rights sense.
In another strong echo of the modern PRC circumstance, the
corporatization of Da Sheng under law and the simultaneous creation
of a class of "shareholder-owners" did little to empower those
investors, at least insofar as management of Da Sheng or any of the
affiliated enterprises was concerned. Zhang Jian was not elected by
those shareholders to the position of managing director (zongli) of the
enterprise and instead just continued as the manager of the
enterprise through the transition from guanshang heban to company
limited by shares.105 When faced with criticism at the first
shareholders' meeting in 1907-because of rich salaries and bonuses
given to other managers (including family) and even funding of
welfare and educational projects expressive of the personal virtue of
Zhang Jian-Zhang Jian was able to ignore the shareholder concerns
and instead critique the shareholders for seeking involvement in
substantive decision making in enterprise affairs.106 Indeed, the
shareholders of the corporatized entity were never able to stop Zhang
Jian from engaging in these transactions, which as they complained
for years were both related party transactions (in a situation where
104. See id. at 136-37 (laying out the organization of the Dasheng business
complex as a whole, and the function of the No. 1 Cotton Mill in that complex).
105. Id. at 126-127.
106. Precisely the reason the patriarch of the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco
enterprise resisted seeking finance of the family business (necessary to compete with
British American Tobacco) via incorporation and a minority equity public float because
it would lead to the introduction of "disloyal", short-term oriented, and non-family-tied
investors. COCHRAN 1980, supra note 33, at 96-102.
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Zhang Jian and his family probably held shares under so-called
business names) or aspects of corporate "waste."0 7 This first
interaction then between newly minted Da Sheng "shareholders" and
continuing managing director, part government official, part
promoter, reveals the state of corporate governance in the Chinese
tradition of the early twentieth century, a picture deeply familiar for
those who study modern PRC corporatized SOE groups and their
listed companies.
Likewise, the fact of corporatization and the conferring of limited
liability on the Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill did very little to change
the status quo ante of the enterprise's internal governance, other than
the start of annual general shareholders' meetings in 1907. Thus,
internal management of the enterprise remained static, with the
various department heads still directly appointed by the "managing
director" (Zhang Jian) rather than the new "board of directors"
(dongshiju).10 8 Moreover, even though the 1904 Qing company law
regulation required the appointment of two "auditors" to review the
accounts of the newly corporatized entity, the Da Sheng auditors
were actually Da Sheng board members, and thus also directly under
the power of Zhang Jian as the managing director, and therefore
generally functioned to justify the decisions they had signed off on
qua directors.10 9 As K611 summarizes the changes not wrought by
incorporation:
On the whole, incorporation, which we tend to associate with "modern"
business enterprise in the Western sense, did not seem to lead to significant
improvements in shareholder protections or curbs on the power of the
managing director [Zhang Jian]. To judge from the complaints at the 1907
meeting and their complete futility, shareholders were still at a disadvantage
despite the potential for openness and accountability through incorporation.
The balance of power did not change in the company. The fact that from 1919
on shareholder meetings frequently took place in Zhang Jian's private villa in
Nantong City symbolically confirmed his steady, strong personal hold over [Da
Sheng] and his power vis-h-vis its shareholders.
1 1 0
Sixth, and perhaps most evocative of modern-day PRC enterprise
structures, financial and managerial control of the entire Da Sheng
group of enterprises (corporatized and not, listed and not) was
exercised by a Shanghai "office" external to the formal legal and
reporting network of companies, group departments, and productive
operations, and ruled absolutely by Zhang Jian and his personal team
(including, but not limited to, family members), few of whom had
formal management or equity positions in the Da Sheng complex of
107. See KOLL, supra note 33, at 127 (detailing Zhang Jian's unpopular business
practices and the shareholder esponse to them).
108. Id. at 129.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 129-30.
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subsidiaries and affiliated enterprises."' That office was the Da
Sheng consortium's "Shanghai Central Accounts Office" (hu
zongzhangfang), authorized in financial reporting terms by the
company's 1897 articles of association, but already by 1910 the
absolute center of decision-making and what would today be called
intra-company finance for the entire Da Sheng group.112
Above I have described how Da Sheng both (i) invested in group
subsidiaries and (ii) contributed cash capital to "affiliated" group
enterprises without making equity investment but instead by
"depositing" funds (cun) with the affiliates. Eventually, the external
investors in Da Sheng complained about this method of intra-group
financing and so at the first post-incorporation shareholders' meeting
of 1907 suggested the establishment of a true holding company, the
Tonghai Industrial Limited Liability Company; the idea being that an
entity fully capitalized by Da Sheng would be under the indirect
governance power of the Da Sheng investors.113 As shareholder Zheng
Xiaoxu argued at that shareholders' meeting, "the volume of
transactions between the subsidiary companies and Da Sheng . .. has
become too large. [It is necessary] to draw a clear line by taking all
the debts of the various companies as the share capital of the Tonghai
Industrial Limited Liability Company.""4 In the event, the new
holding company was duly authorized but in fact made into a free
standing account of the Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill entity, whereby
"deposit" debt to the affiliated enterprises was written off or
converted into Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill's equity in the debtor
enterprise held by the holding company.115 This attempt at reform of
intra-group transactions and financial flows spurred by the Da Sheng
shareholders, and its almost immediate frustration, reveals the true
function of the Shanghai Central Accounts Office (under the personal
supervision of Zhang Jian, not the Da Sheng firm or its managers): it
was a vehicle for management and financial control of the entire
group of enterprises and an institution that allowed Zhang Jian and
his fellow insiders to almost completely work around the incorporated
Da Sheng No. 1 Cotton Mill that had procured capital from external
investors.116 For in fact, the affiliated enterprises and subsidiaries of
Da Sheng reported not to the No. 1 Cotton Mill incorporated entity,
much less the Tonghai Industrial Limited Liability Company
established to assuage concerned shareholders, but instead to the
Shanghai Central Accounts Office, an institution not referred to in
the company's articles or any statute or regulation but which
111. See id. at 131 (outlining the internal organization of the Da Sheng business
group, and recounting excerpts from Zhang Jian's diaries).
112. Id. at 135-36.
113. Id. at 139.
114. Id. at 139-40.
115. See id. at 140-41.
116. Id. at 141.
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consistently acted as the true holding company or finance holding
company for the entire Da Sheng group.1 17
As K6ll demonstrates in precise detail, the Shanghai Central
Accounts Office acted as investment company, and paymaster and
broker, for the Da Sheng subsidiaries and affiliated companies. With
the head of the Shanghai Office dealing directly with the managing
director of Da Sheng (Zhang Jian), this "office" did everything a group
headquarters/holding company might do and more: it invested in (via
"deposits") and received interest on deposits directed at the affiliates;
managed and drafted the accounts of the affiliates; represented the
Da Sheng group of enterprises in Shanghai (and engaged in group
product transportation and sales, the negotiation of loans, and sale of
equity interests (including the delivery of share certificates), for such
entities); ordered machinery for affiliated enterprises; made
payments to external institutions on behalf of Da Sheng and/or group
affiliates; balanced out intra-enterprise accounts moving net amounts
to the affiliates; and decided how various group financial transactions
should be entered and on which affiliate's books, etc.1 18 Critically,
this mere "office" effected all of these group transactions not from the
platform of an independently established holding entity or via cross-
directorships that-in law or via property rights connections-
controlled the subsidiaries or affiliates, but through an entirely extra-
legal institution that operated outside of shareholder governance or
management and without regard to separate legal personality,
distinct aggregations of investors, or the notion of separate accounts.
Perhaps just as important, the Shanghai Central Accounts Office was
at the same time Zhang Jian's personal office running his private and
family accounts, with receipts and expenditures easily commingled
with Da Sheng accounts and transactions.'19 This is not to say that
Zhang Jian was in the modern sense "corrupt," or that he
impermissibly used the Da Sheng complex of enterprises as a piggy
bank from which he consistently misappropriated value. Instead, the
Shanghai Central Accounts Office reveals the existence of (i) a well-
understood institution in Chinese commercial organization that
effectively looks through the constraints of separate legal personality,
accountability to investors in specific entities, and independent entity
accounts; and (ii) the mechanism by which personal (insider) control
of a family of enterprises, many financed with the capital of
strangers, is implemented and maintained, an aspect of control which
does not distinguish between private power and managerial control
over publicly financed assets. After noting the roots of this kind of
117. See id. (positing that Zhang Jian did not want to regulate and publicize the
activities of the Shanghai Office, which was the true head of the Da Sheng business
complex).
118. Id. at 141-43.
119. Id. at 144.
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central office or account hub in traditional Chinese family businesses,
and even other post-Republican explicitly corporate structures, K6l
summarizes:
As this institution [the traditional accounts office in Chinese family businesses]
was adapted to an industrial joint-stock enterprise with limited liability, one
would expect conflicts of interest between the shareholders and the managing
director (who was also the founder). However, in Zhang Jian's case, his
personal authority and control were not curtailed by but embedded in the
Shanghai office as an institutionalized tool of control. In fact, the internal
organization of the Shanghai office and its placement outside the formal
structure of the [Da Sheng] complex allowed Zhang Jian to exert full vertical
authority, to use a modern management expression.1 2 0
Seventh and finally, Zhang Jian as the official cum private
promoter of the Da Sheng complex relied heavily on a network of
individuals, which included but was not limited to family members
(notably his brother Zhang Cha) and non-family associates with
business, political, or personal ties.12 1 People with a superficial
understanding of Chinese business organization might assume that
such networks would have to be based in family ties. Zhang Jian's
promotion and management of the Da Sheng consortium makes clear,
however, that such Chinese networks are not exclusively family
based, but instead are rooted in a network of individuals with
common work experiences, geographical backgrounds, or involvement
in a specific sector of industry of commerce. This kind of network
might be seen as the analog to modern day PRC enterprise groups,
which can be dominated by networks rarely based in familial
relationships and not truly disturbed by Communist Party
appointments, but instead affiliated with a given "system" (xitong)-
for the PRC's present day corporatized SOE groups, the ministry
group from which the enterprise group sprung.122
A final word about what the historical literature calls "family
enterprise" in pre-CCP-ruled China: Family businesses of course have
a very long tradition in China, and those long-standing family firms
gave rise to a large number of important enterprises. Specifically, the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw apparently "modern"
enterprises grow out of family businesses, which increasingly
engaged with the law and legality after promulgation of the Gongsilii
in 1904 and successor statutes and regulations. Between 1904 and
1908, 272 companies registered with the Qing government, more than
50 percent of them as what would be recognized as joint stock
companies with limited liability.12 3 Indeed, after the fall of the Qing
dynasty in 1911, and into the uncharted waters of the Provisional
120. Id. at 146.
121. Id. at 69.
122. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 32.
123. KOLL, supra note 33, at 17.
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Republic, the Beiyang Government of Yuan Shikai, and the warlord
contest that followed, family businesses continued to register as joint
stock companies with whatever Beijing-based regime claimed the title
of national government.124 Importantly, although registered as
companies under then-applicable corporate law, many of the
apparently incorporated family businesses were governed in
contravention of law and entirely pursuant to norms applicable to
family partnerships with no separation of ownership and
management (at least with respect to family owners) and scant
regard for, even hostility towards, stranger investors.125 In that
sense-formal corporatization under law with incumbent control
powers undisturbed-such incorporated family businesses show a
similarity to the PRC's corporatized SOEs. In addition, and as
described above with respect to Zhang Jian's Shanghai Central
Accounts Office for his Da Sheng group of entities, these incorporated
family businesses also used the office of "financial controller" to
allocate finance capital within the corporate group and its controlling
shareholders-with the same lack of respect for legal person or
independent accounting unit boundaries seen in today's PRC finance
company transactions and the same diversions of value implemented
by official patrons of the guandu shangban and guanshang heban
enterprises.
IV. COMMONALITIES AND DISTINCTIONS
The unavoidably superficial and perhaps overly-specific
recitation above should allow observers of the modern PRC's
corporatized SOEs to see distinct commonalities between China's
largest companies and corporate groups today and their firm
ancestors from the late 1800s and early to mid-1900s. Above all, each
generation of firm institution evidences acceptance of the strong
Legalist assumption that state control of the key instruments of the
productive economy was and is necessary in order to bring wealth and
power to the Chinese nation. This assumption strongly refutes a long
time counter-assumption (foreign and Chinese)-a touch "Orientalist"
or at least mildly exoticizing-which speaks to the hostility of the
Confucian tradition to merchant (private, commercial) activity per se.
Reflecting on history, there is an almost unshakeable view that the
Chinese state, of whatever species, must control industrial
development and the instruments that can bring about such
development.
Second, it seems clear that one of the key policy drivers
supporting large-scale and state-controlled Chinese enterprises is the
124. Id. at 41.
125. See COCHRAN 80, supra note 33.
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desire to create entities that can resist the political and economic
incursions in China made by foreign firms or simply aggregations of
capital managed by non-Chinese interests. Even though it seems
slightly ironic in a world where PRC enterprises "march outside" (zou
chuqu) seeking control of assets and businesses abroad, the project of
firm development that commenced in the nineteenth century must be
seen as in part defensive, and in the modern era, effective.
Third, the same mix of policy imperatives over more than one
hundred years led to the same kind of firm institution in the 1880s as
now seen in the late 2010s: the state was (and is) intent on
maintaining state control and creating entities that can check foreign
capital and competitors, while also raising enough capital to fund the
appropriate scale of operations but without disturbing the state's
incumbent control position. Where the state cannot or will not pony
up that capital, the easy answer is public capital markets financing
which introduces significant funds to the state-dominated firm
alongside the assurance of passive or entirely dominated "stranger"
investors. Thus was born both the initial guandu shangban entity
described above, and the (still) state-dominated corporatized SOE
issuer collecting capital on the world's capital markets with a
decidedly minority float (and the public capital markets-accessing
company predecessor, the Chinese-foreign joint venture which from
the late 1970s matched foreign capital (and know-how) alongside
mostly insolvent state-owned assets).126
Fourth, in both eras state law seems to have little traction on or
relevance for what is the quintessential "legal" form, the modern
corporation with legal personality, limited liability for shareholders,
centralized management and alienation of shareholders, and
accountability of managers to owners, all conferred by law. As noted
above, China's first firms were created without benefit of any statute,
regulation, or even imperial edict, but instead came as a policy
innovation conceived and implemented by a powerful government
official. Even when something like law did appear in 1904, these
corporate entities either acted outside of such mundane constraints or
imposed work-arounds which thoroughly gutted any law-based
architecture, rules, or standards, and any possibility of voicing
minority shareholder rights or enforcing governance constraints.
Similarly, even though the PRC's first post-Revolution Company Law
appeared in 1994, and was well and expertly re-written in 2006, it
still has embedded in it an entire section (i.e., the part regarding the
WSOC sub-species of LLC) and many provisions with an extreme
"shareholder orientation" (pernicious, where corporatized entities are
dominated by a Party State controlling shareholder), which only
make sense for the establishment of corporatized SOEs with no, or
126. See YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
DURING THE REFORM ERA 340-42 (2003).
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radically disempowered, minority shareholders. As many
commentators have remarked, the PRC Company Law was never
imposed upon corporatizing SOEs, instead the corporatization
without privatization program has worked in the opposite direction to
almost fully cannibalize China's "modern enterprise" system
aspirations and the law that shapes and enforces it.127 In the modern
case then, the seeds of a thoroughgoing disrespect of company law,
shareholder protections, and managerial accountability reside in the
PRC Company Law itself.
Fifth, firms in both eras are established and able to operate only
with the contribution of public, or non-privately owned, assets into
the apparently autonomous corporate vehicle, and in an environment
with quasi-monopoly protections provided to the enterprise by the
state promoter, regulated pricing (in the form of discounted inputs or
guaranteed margins embedded in revenues), and something like a
fixed income return to non-state investors. Thus, such companies are
anything but entrepreneurial or (for initial investors) risk-bearing,
but instead represent the opportunity to purchase a fixed return via
participation in a state-protected monopoly or franchise.
Sixth, Chinese firm establishments across more than a century
share a perpetual contest over who precisely will govern these
massive aggregations of capital, a contest between state (court, or
Party) functionaries on one side, and private sector entrepreneurs
(merchants and merchant participation in the Qing), on the other.
Through Chinese history, the respective power balance has been
extremely fluid, and as noted above, made more complex given the
opportunistic migration of "official"-side personnel to the "merchant"
side (very often along with control of what were state assets). This
contest is unavoidable, because assets and governance power must be
tied to individuals or networks of individuals and cannot be the
instruments of the paradigmatic "absent principal," the imperial
court or "all the people" (or "the state" or the Party behind the Party
State). Nonetheless, this struggle over governance of firms and their
productive assets has very serious implications for the efficiency
gains that can be wrought from them, and the transfer of public
assets into what looks like a private, and what economists assume is
a more efficient, sector. Moreover, it has significant implications for
the extent to which generally applicable state legal norms or
regulation can be enforced or effective against corporate actors who
represent he same state that promoted the enterprise.
Seventh, this look back in history reveals clearly the roots of the
particular PRC institution that is the corporatized SOE group
127. Clarke & Howson, supra note 11, at 245-47; Clarke, Corporate Governance
in China: An Overview, supra note 11, at 494-95; Howson, Corporate Law in the
Shanghai People's Courts, supra note 11, at 321-27; Howson, "Quack Corporate
Governance", supra note 11, at 689-94.
[VOL 50:96i1002
CORPORATIZATION WITHOUT PRIVATIZATION
"finance holding company." As noted above with respect to Zhang
Jian's Shanghai Central Accounts Office, as was a common feature of
family business consortia in China and the Chinese diaspora, and as
functioned through the person of the sponsoring official in the earliest
days of the guandu shangban firms (e.g., Li Hongzhang, Zhang
Zhidong, Sheng Xuanhuai, etc.), the history of Chinese firms shows
the presence of an institution (or a person) which directly managed
group governance and financing, without any regard for legal
boundaries, property rights, or governance structures. One need not be
offended by such obvious disregard for these formal relationships;
instead, one can simply recognize that, for good or ill, PRC enterprise
groups, even with companies listed on the world's most mature
markets and subject to the most modern corporate law and securities
regulation, still exert managerial and financial control over their
group entities through such institutions, and still in disregard of
formally proclaimed boundaries or governance relationships. This
insight is useful in understanding the function of finance holding
companies not only in the PRC, but also the superior Communist
Party system that sits behind all formal (legal) enterprise
institutions, like the board of directors, the officers corps, etc.128
Finally, this historical consideration of Chinese firm
development from the mid-1800s on demonstrates a pattern that is
also discernible today. These aggregations of state assets (or access to
a state franchise or monopoly) are initially financed by external
investors invited in with the promise of significant enterprise
autonomy and shareholder wealth maximization. Admittedly, those
promises might be subordinate to what in the Qing was a
"guaranteed return" and the chance to make money in the embrace of
a state-enforced monopoly, yet they appeared to be important
promises, at least from the standpoint of central government policy
makers anxious to attract such investment. (Just as later in Chinese
history, under both the Qing court and later the Communist Party of
China, guarantees residing in formal "law" seemed important.)
Notwithstanding those initial promises, however, both in the late
Qing and in the contemporary PRC, the trajectory whereby the state
has reasserted its governance power over such assets after initial
promotion and financing is extremely common. In history, this has
occurred both with the financial success of the enterprise, or the
occurrence of a broader political or military crisis. The only real
deviation from this pattern has occurred when former state
128. See Nicholas Calcina Howson, China's Restructured Commercial Banks:
Nomenklatura Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA'S
EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123, 129-131 (Zhu
Min et al. eds., John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd. 2009) (describing the continued, and
determinative, role of Party organizations and cadres behind formal corporate and
legal structures).
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functionaries leave their official role and misappropriate what were
state assets (albeit financed by external investors) to assert
governance over them-and the returns-as non-state actors (e.g.,
Sheng Xuanhuai and Zhang Jian in the late Qing, PLA officers in the
1990s, the insiders connected to Pingan and Anbang in the 2010s,
etc.).
Of course, it goes without saying that China, and the world, in
the late 1800s and the 2010s are very different, and some of those
differences frustrate the effort to see a useful identity between the
state-promoted firms of long ago and today's corporatized SOE
behemoths. China's degree and style of engagement with the outside
world is radically different, although in this context, only better in
that the PRC and its corporate issuers are able to access a much
deeper global market for capital (compare Shanghai's Fuzhou Road
Teahouse Exchange from the 1880s and the New York Stock
Exchange presently). Likewise, the pressures that China faces, and
the occasional "shocks" it must navigate, are of a different order
(contrast the defeat of the Qing empire by the upstart Japanese in
1895 and the humiliation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, on one side,
and the lesser shocks presented to the PRC by the WTO accession in
2000, the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, and the Chinese stock
exchange "crashes" of 2015-16). The situation in the late nineteenth
century was dire for China and constituted an existential threat to its
sovereign power and the very fact of imperial government (duly
overthrown in 1911). Nonetheless, both eras present the same
development and nation strengthening imperatives, which shaped
and shape similar responses at least insofar as enterprise
establishment was and is concerned. Finally, by way of example, the
development of a domestic legal and regulatory system in China, and
engagement by China with external legal and regulatory systems, are
now of a completely different order than what they were at the end of
the 1800s. That being true, it only highlights the strong persistence
or path dependency of certain institutions, arrangements and
practices related to enterprise formation, financing, and governance
stretching back more than a century, and notwithstanding real
advances in what the PRC calls "legal construction."
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to draw a line between specific
institutions that arose or were promoted by the Qing court in the
latter part of the 1880s and contemporary China's corporatized SOE
enterprise groups and their domestically and internationally listed
subsidiaries.
The aim of this Article has been to show that the PRC's program
of "corporatization without privatization"-whereby traditional SOEs
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or specific groups of SOE assets were transformed into companies
limited by shares under the PRC Company Law and financed through
the public capital markets (domestic and foreign), but continue to be
managed by non-professional CCP nomenklatura appointments and
feature transparent exploitation of non-state capital investors by
controlling (state) shareholders empowered under a "shareholder-
oriented" corporate law-is not something that rose from a blank
slate in the mid-1990s.
Instead, these modern era PRC institutions have their roots in
very similar enterprise establishments conceived in the mid-1880s
and continuing right through to the start of the Anti-Japanese War,
wherein the state promoted large-scale enterprise in protected or
monopoly sectors deemed necessary to build China's "wealth and
power" with the promise of a guaranteed return and non-state
management o attract non-state capital investment.
In the modern case, this program has succeeded beyond the wildest
dreams of any PRC policy maker, allowing the nation to finance the
creation and maintenance of the world's largest (by market
capitalization and revenues) enterprises critical to China's industrial
development policy and ability to compete globally, without any
promise of autonomous management much less ousting of state
functionaries from their direct management role.
Indeed, if the comparison holds, it only means that the future
trajectory of PRC firm development will see ever-increasing assertion
of state control over such enterprises as the financing mechanism has
worked and continues to work well, and there is no cost associated
with, or real resistance-political, economic, or legal-to, state
controlling shareholder domination even when identified. There are
only two ways in which this trajectory in the direction of increasing
state-controlling shareholder domination may be altered. First, if
state origin insiders continue to misappropriate state assets initially
placed under their governance power and convert them and the
associated value flows to private or non-state property (their own),
then there may be enough domestic political resistance-elite and
popular-to re-think the process and its institutional expressions.
(The PRC is seeing some of this resistance in the course of the still
very popular Anti-Corruption Campaign being implemented by Xi
Jinping and Wang Qishan.) Second, there is the chance, but only a
slim chance, that foreign capital participation in these enterprises
(and eventually perhaps domestic investor participation), and the
expectations of such investors regarding formal legal constraints and
enforcement, may push back against minority shareholder oppression
or firm-injuring self-dealing by the control shareholders and/or their
agents, or force equity price discounts unacceptably large for the
securities issuers involved. This possibility is slim because the
investor population that now participates in the modern PRC's
version of the late Qing's guandu shangban or guanshang heban
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enterprise is much more diffuse and distant, and never had the
expectations dear to the late nineteenth century "merchant"
investor/operators of any management influence in the first place.
Ironically then, a twentieth century Communist Party-led
government navigating modern capital and information markets, and
facing the existence of a substantive domestic legal system, has
achieved for its enterprises and national development strategy what a
nineteenth century imperial regime-even without the burden of
international investment expectations or developed legal and
regulatory systems-could not for its enterprises or national
development program.
